Effective
Joint Sector Reviews for
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
(WASH)

A Study and Guidance—2016

January 2016

WORLD BANK GROUP
Water

wsp
water and
sanitation program

This study report analyzes Joint Sector Reviews for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and provides, as practical guidance, on how to introduce and effectively manage them. It is accompanied by a shorter Learning Note and a poster.

Photo credits: Kerstin Danert, Sean Furey, Mogens Mechta, and Martin Laeng.

Effective Joint Sector Reviews for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

A Study and Guidance—2016

Joint Sector Reviews are social and technical.

Emphasize learning
Strengthen reporting
Adapt over time
Encourage open discussion
Publish the documentation

Link to implementation and services on the ground!

Acknowledgments

Summary

Study background, scope, and methodology

This is the first consolidated and referenced multicountry study of Water or Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Joint Sector Reviews (JSRs). The study report and associated Learning Note and Poster provide an understanding of JSR processes and practical guidance on how to introduce and improve them. The study sets out a methodology in the form of visual checklists to reflect and take stock of WASH JSR processes. This could also form the foundation for subsequent cross-country comparisons of the JSR process.

The publications provide an analysis of JSRs as well as practical guidance on how to introduce and effectively manage them. The initial focus of the work was on JSRs in fragile states. However, the contested definitions of a fragile state, arbitrary thresholds as well as the realization that there are common issues with respect to JSRs in nonfragile countries led to a widening of the scope of countries studied. Notably, all countries included are considerably donor dependant for WASH. The study considered 25 countries, and found that between 2001 and 2015, WASH JSRs had taken place in 19 of them.

The study methodology comprised a review of grey and published literature, first-hand experience by the study authors of supporting JSR processes in Ghana, Liberia, and Uganda as well as stakeholder interviews. To respect the confidentiality of interviewees, their names, institutions and countries have been kept anonymous. This study also drew on a two-week in-country study of the JSR process in Nepal. In-country studies were envisaged for Burundi, Burkina Faso, and South Sudan, but could not be undertaken due to security concerns and uncertainty regarding the political situation at the time. This is indicative of the challenges faced by states suffering from fragility and protracted crisis.

What is a Joint Sector Review?

A JSR process refers to a periodic assessment of performance within a specific sector (for example, education, agriculture, water supply, and sanitation) by government, development partners, and civil society. The reviews are ideally an integral part of the country's planning and reporting cycle. A JSR process includes a half-yearly, annual or biennial gathering, meeting or forum which is led by a sector ministry and has the participation of a wide range of stakeholders. The process usually consolidates evidence through analysis of data, studies, and reports in the run-up to the actual gathering. It may include field visits. This study defines a 'Joint Sector Review' as *a periodic process that brings different stakeholders in a particular sector together to engage in dialogue, review status, progress and performance and take decisions on priority actions.*

At their best, JSR processes provide a reliable overview of finance, implementation, institutions, and gaps; bring sector stakeholders together; and contribute towards driving reforms and improving sector governance. At their worst, there is hurried preparation for a poorly facilitated gathering that identifies a plethora of problems and priorities for action that fail to be implemented or followed-up on. Most JSR processes fall somewhere in between the above extremes. In some cases, national policies, strategies, and plans are reviewed but actual improvements to services, or significant problems, are missed out. Despite their shortcomings, JSRs provide a meaningful platform for convening sector stakeholders, and there is widespread belief in their potential to stimulate positive change. JSR processes continue to evolve and should be encouraged.

Mutual accountability

In countries where multiple donors are financing WASH and are not providing general budget support, JSRs are one of the few mechanisms that can bring about mutual accountability at a country level. However, the lack of publication of performance reports that feed into JSRs as well as of the proceedings undermines this. Online JSR documentation was only available in seven out of 19 countries where JSRs have taken place. This lack of transparency occurs despite the participation and support of JSRs by numerous organizations that lead WASH internationally. While there are some very good examples, in general, the data, presentation and referencing of JSR reports need to be much more rigorous. The study concludes that WASH JSR's contribution to mutual accountability can be demonstrated in only a few countries, despite its potential. Although government needs to lead the JSR process, donors also have to take responsibility for it to happen. Donors must play an active role and also be held accountable for their results through the process.

WASH JSR experience and typology

Within Water or WASH, experience of JSR processes can be grouped as follows:

- **Mature**: An established cycle, with more than a decade of regular JSR processes.
- **Intermediate**: An establishing cycle, with five to 10 years of JSR processes so far, taking place every year, or sometimes every second year.
- **Basic**: Limited experience, with less than five JSR processes so far. Within this group, there are two types of countries:
  - **Continuing**: Commitment and ability of government and its partners to the continuation of JSR processes in the future.
  - **Discontinued**: JSR gathering discontinued after some time.
- **No experience** of JSR processes.

The topics reviewed vary: some countries include water resources, water for agriculture and livestock and solid waste management; some focus on project implementation; others concentrate on policies, strategies and coordination. The JSR scope depends on national structures and in-country donor interest.

Findings

JSRs are highly relevant for fragile states, countries suffering from protracted crisis or where multiple agencies are operating. The processes are highly appreciated by those involved as a platform for sharing and building relationships and may be the only time different government agencies come together, or that nongovernmental/civil society organizations (NGO/CSO) and government representatives meet to discuss sector issues.

Priority actions are being set through JSR processes. However, there are challenges in both monitoring and implementing them. If JSRs are to have wider impact, including as a mutual accountability mechanism, they need to become an integral part of the national (or state or province) planning and reporting process rather than a separate process (or side-show). Involvement of the finance and planning ministries alongside long-term donor partners who fund implementation as well as support analytical work is essential.

This study has not found a magic formula for when to embark on a JSR, and whether a country first needs, for example, a sector investment plan or monitoring system. There is no JSR blueprint that can simply be lifted from one context and applied to another. JSR processes evolve over time in light of the national or local context. They can and should be done in fragile contexts. It is unrealistic to expect any long-term change from a one-off JSR meeting or gathering. The preparations, as well as follow-up from the gathering, are as important as the gathering itself, if not more so.

The study has identified over 60 different elements that form a JSR process and grouped them into (i) how the sector works; (ii) the scope of themes or subsectors reviewed; and (iii) how the JSR is organized. These are set out in a visual checklist, together with the related aspects of the wider context including laws, policies, stakeholders, program and project implementation, operation of services, monitoring and reporting. The visual checklists, together with guidance on good JSR practice provide a basis to assess and reflect on the JSR process for improvement.

Overview of a JSR Process—Set within the Wider Context

Moving forward at country and global level, the authors conclude with 16 considerations for enabling JSRs to be effective:

The JSR process

1. Government needs to lead the JSR process and may need to decide which sector ministry, or ministries, take responsibility.
2. Although government needs to lead the JSR process, donors also have to assume responsibility for JSRs to happen. Donors must play an active role including transparent reporting.
3. JSRs should evolve over time. If resources are limited, it is possible to start with a JSR that is small in terms of scope, with a fewer number of stakeholders participating.
4. Finance and planning ministries need to be involved, and data from public financial management systems should be utilized where it exists.
5. Enable representatives from all government agencies involved in the JSR scope (including local government) to participate. Provide the opportunity for water user associations, donor agencies, international and local NGOs, CSOs, the private sector, academia, and the media to take part. Include those involved in humanitarian assistance, or emergency response as well as those in development.
6. Within the process, try to set a limited number of priority actions that are SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound), specifying which organization will take the lead. This can be a government entity, a development partner or other stakeholder depending on who is most appropriate. All priority actions that require financial resources or changes to implementation or policy need to be multiyear, with annual milestones.
7. The documents and reports generated before and after the JSR gathering should be finalized, widely disseminated, and published online, preferably by government. Newspaper articles/inserts, posters, radio/television programs and interviews should be used to inform the public about the JSR process and WASH status. Nonstate actors should also disseminate public JSR documentation though their newsletters and websites. Online access to national (or state) WASH JSR documents needs to become an integral part of national as well as global WASH culture.
8. Everyone involved in the JSR has to create the interface between the JSR process and service delivery, implementation, reforms, and the wider context. The JSR can be used to review finance, progress and status of WASH and can be embedded within existing reporting and planning, but this takes time to achieve.
9. The JSR scope, how it is organized and its relevance, effectiveness, and impact should be reviewed regularly.

The WASH sector

10. Every country should develop a realistic sector investment plan for WASH (or wider, depending on the in-country scope). It must be able to show different investment scenarios and models such as reaching the national targets, the Sustainable Development Goals, and lower levels of service where international targets are unrealistic.
11. A monitoring and evaluation framework setting out what will be measured, including indicators, by whom, as well as reporting flows and data consolidation is fundamental for coherent sector monitoring. Where this does not exist, the JSR process should be used to support its preparation. This framework can start with a few indicators but should clarify how to capture humanitarian assistance as well as development intervention.
12. To operationalize the monitoring and evaluation framework (item 11), human capacities, and finance are required to collect, store, analyze, and synthesize data, as well as present and

communicate it. Capacity for JSR participation as well as monitoring and evaluation needs to be strengthened, and restrengthened, particularly if staff turnover is high.

13. States and government are not monoliths. Even in contexts where the state is predatory, there will usually be parts of the system, or particular institutions, bureaucrats or ministries with which aid actors can work. Long-term donor commitment to the sector and the country, as well as flexibility, is absolutely essential and closely linked to the "Collaborative Behaviors", endorsed by Sanitation and Water for All (SWA) partners, including "one platform for mutual accountability".

14. NGOs, CSOs, donor agencies, and other development partners need to adhere to national reporting systems, including those for WASH. NGO networks, umbrella organizations, and consortia all have a very important role to play in bringing these organizations together, and facilitate as well as consolidate NGO/CSO reporting. It is also essential that the financial as well as in-kind support by all development partners be reported in-country in a transparent manner.

15. International technical assistance, mentoring, and mediation can be instrumental in providing support to the JSR processes but needs to be aligned with country systems and needs. Arguably, JSR processes are essential in a multiagency environment. At the global level, international agencies should:

    a. Create incentives for, and encourage, country level staff working in development assistance and humanitarian work to collaborate and effectively engage in and strengthen JSR processes and linkages, including reporting in accordance with local, national, and WASH cluster reporting systems.

    b. Use the JSR process to inform and guide agencies' in-country activities, funding, programs and studies.

    c. Improve the evidence on WASH JSRs in the Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS) report by demonstrating that they took place, including providing links to the most recent relevant documents and noting where these are not available.

    d. Support countries to start or review their own WASH JSR processes and links to other key activities. Enable countries to learn from each other by facilitating learning visits, multicountry seminars or remote exchange (for example, discussion groups, webinars).

    e. Clarify linkages between WASH 'sustainability checks' and other audits, evaluations or analytical tools and JSRs.

    f. Undertake another multicountry review of WASH JSRs as follow-on to this study in the next three to five years. Improve the methodology. Address certain aspects in greater depth, such as the relationship between JSR effectiveness and how well processes are embedded in sector reforms, finance agreements, program implementation or long-term donor support, as well as their impact.

    g. Undertake further work to deepen the understanding of how to provide flexible but effective support, including capacity strengthening in fragile states and countries in protracted crisis.

    h. Set an example of transparency in WASH by publishing country reports, evaluation reports, and physical audits online and placing WASH JSR documentation on country pages.

    i. Support the development of training materials, online courses, and on-job training for leading and participating in JSR process (including data compilation and analysis, writing and reviewing reports, proper referencing, field validation, moderation, conflict resolution, and setting priorities) as well as the linkages between JSRs and national planning and reporting.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CSO	Civil society organization
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
FEDWASUN	Federation of Drinking Water and Sanitation Users Nepal
GIZ	*Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*
GLAAS	Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IDP	Internally displaced person
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
JAR	Joint Annual Review
JSR	Joint Sector Review
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RAC	*Revue Annuelle Conjointe*
REGIDESO	*Régie de Production et de Distribution d'Eau et d'Electricité*
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SPR	Sector Performance Report
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approach
TAWASANET	Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network
UWASNET	Uganda Water and Sanitation Network
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organization
WSDP	Water Sector Development Programme
WSP	Water and Sanitation Program

Glossary

There are several common aspects of a JSR which are named differently in different countries. In such cases, the authors have tried to use one consistent term throughout. The terms used in the report are given here, together with the various words that have been found in use.

Term Used in Study Report	Definition	Other Terms Used
Gathering	The main event in which stakeholders assemble to discuss sector status and progress	Meeting Forum Conference
Joint Sector Review Process	A process that brings different stakeholders together to review the status and progress of the sector, discuss (and disagree), and take decisions on priority actions	Annual Water Sector Conference Coordination Meeting Joint Water Sector Review Multi-Stakeholder Forum Joint Annual Review WASH Conference Revue Annuelle Conjointe Revue Annuelle Sectorielle Conjointe
Priority Actions	The most important things that need to be done to improve the sector, as decided by the sector leaders in consultation with others	Commitments Declaration points Priority actions Priority measures Key actions Recommendations Recommended priority actions Undertakings Urgent recommendations

Contents

1   Introduction

Our bodies contain a significant amount of water, and we cannot live more than a few days without drinking it. There is no substitute for water; the implications of physical or produced scarcity, or poor quality, of water on human life and development are tremendous. Water is needed for domestic use, agriculture and industry, including the extraction and refinement of oil. Humans must share water with each other, and with nature. The subject of water is emotive, and everyone has an opinion. Providing or withholding access is a matter of technical knowhow, management, finance, politics, and power. Water needs to be managed at the local level, but this is influenced by what happens elsewhere. Differences in topography, climate, geology social cohesion, and wealth mean that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for water supply. Operating and maintaining water supply services can be more costly than building them in the first place, and water management calls on multiple disciplines. In fact, water governance, its equitable distribution, and protection are one of humankind's most difficult tasks. The investment, skills, and collaboration needed in relation to water is a test for every society and every political regime.

In many low and middle-income countries, a plethora of state and nonstate actors and political leaders are trying to improve and sustain water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services. Service delivery is fragmented, the sector is messy, and progress is not linear. The policies formulated may or may not lead to action, and the funding allocated may or may not be used effectively. Stakeholders do not operate like predictable machines, and a 'WASH sector' cannot simply be fine-tuned like an engine to increase performance.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) call for the availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all by 2030. Such goals, when considered alongside population growth, are very ambitious. Achieving them requires a substantial increase of investment across the globe over the next 15 years and beyond. Despite the human rights context to water and sanitation, with government as duty bearer, the reality is that in many countries WASH still has a relatively low status.

The Sustainable Development Goal target for water means reducing the burden on all women and children.

To meet the SDGs in-country institutions and systems must become stronger, with more skilled personnel in the sector and good regulation. Implementation also needs to improve, right from the planning stage through to construction and follow-up. Reliable reporting, feeding into robust monitoring and evaluation, is essential to verify results, set priorities, and improve policy and practice on the ground. Political leaders, government staff and civil society as well as the global community need to know WASH investment requirements, progress, and gaps. This requires reliable information and immense collaboration.

As if this challenge was not already difficult enough, there are even more concerns about how to achieve SDGs in fragile states or countries suffering from protracted crisis. Fragility manifests itself in one or more dimensions such as violence, inadequate rule of law, weak institutions, weak economic foundation or vulnerability to extreme events or shocks (OECD 2015). In fragile contexts, more than anywhere else, differences of opinion can escalate into disputes and even violent conflict. Obtaining reliable information and ensuring collaboration is extremely difficult.

Numerous international organizations provide financial support, technical assistance, and implement WASH programs and projects. This, coupled with fragmented government responsibility, makes it extremely difficult to identify investment requirements, progress and gaps, never mind setting priorities. A Joint Sector Review (JSR) is a periodic assessment of performance within a specific sector (for instance, WASH, education or agriculture) by governments, development partners, and civil society. It is a participatory process involving multiple stakeholders. JSRs do not just examine government investments and action, but those of others as well, including donor agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and users themselves.

A JSR may be an integral part of national (or state level) planning and reporting, but this is not always the case. JSRs are not standardized; they reflect the priorities (and biases) of in-country stakeholders (that is, governments, donors and NGOs—notably as organizations and individuals). In a JSR, the "homework" is set from within the country, by in-country stakeholders themselves. The multiple perspectives mean that JSRs are explicitly political and social as well as technical process.

In a Joint Sector Review process, in-country stakeholders set their own homework.

Over the past decade or so, there have been efforts to better understand WASH performance and challenges. Analytical tools have been used to provide structure to this rather messy landscape, including the:

- Country Status Overviews (Water and Sanitation Program).
- WASH Bottleneck Analysis Tool (UNICEF).
- Global Assessment and Analysis (GLAAS) Survey (WHO/UNICEF).

The above well-meaning and logically structured tools try to set out service delivery pathways or bottlenecks. To some extent, they have also tried to trigger a sector review process. Set questions are answered by those undertaking the analysis, or providing data and opinions. If applied well, they can help learning, draw out tacit knowledge, advance the sector, uncover problems, and present an overview of the status quo.

However, they focus more on extracting information in a particular format than on building confidence, strengthening in-country analytical capacity, facilitating dialogue or improving mutual accountability. Arguably, these tools are more technical than social or political. The processing of the data, reflection on the

findings and report writing tends to be led by either consultants or stakeholders operating outside the country. In some cases, a report including consolidated data and recommendations is presented in-country for comment before finalization and being published. The above tools can be used to systematically collect information to complement a JSR but cannot replace it.

Despite the increased prevalence and importance of JSRs in international development, there is no standard definition, and the term means different things to different people and organizations. In general, a JSR process includes a half-yearly, annual or biennial meeting or forum which is led by a sector ministry and usually has the participation of a wide range of stakeholders. The process usually includes mechanisms to consolidate and analyze data, studies and reports in the run-up to the actual meeting, and may include field visits. Each review cycle may generate a set of priority actions on specific issues. A WASH JSR is also known as a Joint Annual Review (Yemen), Multi-Stakeholder Forum (Ethiopia), WASH Conference (Sierra Leone), Annual Water Sector Conference (Kenya), Coordination Meeting (South Sudan) or Joint Water Sector Review (Zambia). In French it is usually referred to as *Revue Annuelle Conjointe* (Burkina Faso, Burundi, and Niger) or *Revue Annuelle Sectorielle Conjointe* (Senegal).

There is a lack of stocktaking of JSR experiences in general (Holvoet and Inberg 2009) and particularly for WASH/Water. A study of a sample of JSRs in the education sectors of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger indicates that the JSRs scored highly on harmonization, coordination, leadership and broad-based participation but poorly on alignment, and they generally prioritize accountability over learning (Holvoet and Inberg 2009). A study of Joint Annual Reviews (JARs) of nine countries in the health sector shows that the modalities vary, evolve over time, and contribute to strengthening policy dialogue, alignment, accountability, implementation of the sector plan, and internal resource allocation (IHP+ 2013).

This is the first consolidated and referenced overview of WASH JSRs. The initial focus of the work was on JSRs in fragile states. However, the contested definitions of a fragile state, arbitrary thresholds as well as the realization that there are common issues with respect to JSRs in nonfragile countries led to a widening of the scope of countries studied. Given the considerable contribution of humanitarian agencies to WASH, the term "protracted crisis" was also drawn into the study. Finally, the way forward proposed by the study is applicable to countries classified as both fragile and nonfragile and to those suffering from protracted crisis. What all countries have in common is that multiple agencies operate in them.

The study initially considered 25 countries, of which 19 are fragile and eight face protracted crisis. Countries were selected in which WASH is considerably donor dependent and where there was initial evidence of JSR-type activity. It found that between 2001 and 2015, WASH JSRs had taken place in 19 of the 25 countries.

The study involved a review of gray and published literature, stakeholder interviews[1] and first-hand experience by the study authors of supporting JSR processes in Ghana, Liberia, and Uganda. It also drew on a two-week in-country study of the JSR process in Nepal. This was invaluable to examine the issues raised in more depth, and to refine the visual checklists developed by the study. In-country studies were envisaged for Burundi, Burkina Faso, and South Sudan but could not be undertaken due to security concerns and/or uncertainty regarding the political situation at the time of the study. This is indicative of the challenges faced by states suffering from fragility and protracted crisis.

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[1] To respect the confidentiality of interviewees, their names, institutions, and countries have been kept anonymous.

With very few exceptions, it was very difficult to obtain WASH JSR documents for the countries covered by the study. Only four countries (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Nepal, and Uganda) consistently published their reports on a government website. Some JSR documentation was available online for Kenya, Senegal, and Yemen. A few reports were found on other websites but, for most countries, the reports could not be located online at all (Appendix 1).

Numerous attempts were made to find reports on government websites using search engines with various combinations of the key words for the respective country processes (once these had been established). For the 15 countries with no or very limited online information, documentation was obtained by finding and contacting (and in some cases recontacting) those directly involved in the respective JSR process (Appendix 2). This was a time-consuming process, but was the only way to obtain the information presented and analyzed in this study.

The extensive time taken to collect JSR documentation meant that there was less time than envisaged for analysis. It has not been possible to examine whether the JSR objectives set by each country were met. Face-to-face interviews, as undertaken in Nepal, provided a nuanced understanding of the JSR process and enabled a better exploration of the JSR impacts than the desk study and telephone interviews. Additional in-country work would have enriched the study even more. Despite its limitations, it is hoped that this publication will encourage others to reflect on and examine JSRs in more detail. Reading the study report triggers many "why" questions, such as "*why was the JSR documentation not finalized?*", or *"why were so many priority actions set?"* Most of these questions could not be investigated with the available resources. Rather than speculate about the reasons, such questions are left for others to ask and to follow-up.

The study report, associated Learning Note (Danert et al. 2016), Poster (Furey et al. 2016) and Nepal study (Danert and Karki 2016) provide an analysis of JSRs as well as practical guidance on how to introduce and effectively manage them. The publications are written for WASH and water resource professionals from all over the world. It is hoped that the documents will provide a much better understanding of what WASH JSR processes actually are, and enable them to be strengthened over the coming 15 years as we try to reach the SDG targets and bring about universal access to water and sanitation services and hygiene practices.

The study starts off by considering the context in which WASH JSRs take place, including population growth. It examines the terms *fragile state* and *protracted crisis*, and reflects on the *humanitarian-development* divide. In Chapter 3, the JSR process is defined, with an overview of the years in which WASH JSRs took place in the countries covered by the study. The report subsequently considers the relevance and impact of JSRs and their effectiveness. Drawing on these, it presents a series of visual checklists that can be used to examine JSR effectiveness. The report concludes with a way forward comprising 16 considerations on how WASH JSRs can be improved within countries and how the international community could better support these processes.

2 The Contexts of WASH Joint Sector Reviews

2.1 Population Growth and Environmental Challenges

The proportion of people using improved water and sanitation rose considerably over the last 25 years (JMP 2015a), and is cause for optimism. However, a closer look at the data, together with expected population growth tells a slightly different story. Some countries are already finding it difficult to keep WASH service levels up with population growth and this problem may continue in the future as populations continue to grow and water demand increases further due to economic growth.

Population projections for Sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia up to 2050 are set out in Figures 2 and 3. Water and sanitation use based on current JMP data is also shown, projecting to reach 100 percent by 2030,[2] and continuing to keep pace with population growth up to 2050. These are optimistic scenarios. With the exception of water access in south Asia, the others require a significant step change in rate of service delivery from 2015.

FIGURE 1: WATER AND SANITATION GAP TO 2050 IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA[2]

Note: The dotted lines for water and sanitation coverage are simple linear interpolations between the situation reported by the JMP in 2015 and the SDG target of universal water and sanitation access by 2030. **However**, the SDG access target for access is not the same as for 'improved access' used in the MDGs. Therefore, this graph is only indicative of the challenge ahead.

Sources: Actual: Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) (http://www.wssinfo.org). Projected population: UN Population Division (http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/).

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[2] It should be noted that this is an underestimation of the gap. The SDG indicator and target is likely to incorporate "safe" water, whereas current JMP data counts improved sources, regardless of their safety.

These graphs are intended to illustrate a more important point. Even if the SDG targets are achieved by 2030, this does not mean that the human right to water and sanitation have been achieved for ever. Populations are still rising, so services will need to keep up. The point is that technical fixes, 15-year funding envelopes and agencies working in isolation will not be sufficient to meet growing demands. Collaboration, experimentation, and social innovation are essential to enable this long-term challenge to be addressed. The way that the WASH sector and others work over the next 15 years up to 2030 is merely setting the foundation, and preparing the next generation to deal with what is ahead. Effective JSRs which can foster collaboration and learning may be an important part of this foundation.

FIGURE 2: WATER AND SANITATION GAP TO 2050 IN SOUTH ASIA[2]

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Sources: Actual: Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) (http://www.wssinfo.org). Projected population: UN Population Division (http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/).

Rising population coupled with climate change, industrialization, and increased agriculture is also placing considerable demands on the environment and water resources. Water resources availability and quality can no longer be taken for granted. Deterioration of water quality and reductions in availability in certain parts of the world is raising concerns about future water conflicts.

2.2   Multiple Actors, Fragility, and Protracted Crisis

In many low and middle income countries, WASH is financed by multiple donors, with numerous NGOs providing assistance defined as "humanitarian" or "development". Steets et al. (2011) argue that humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are increasingly both being applied in the same countries and contexts with no connection. The result is short-term orientation of humanitarian assistance, a lack of coordination, discontinuity of project implementation, and insufficient consideration for conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction. Lack of unified decision-making, turf battles, and bureaucratic infighting are recognized features of post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Brinkerhoff 2010). However, many of these shortcomings can also be applied to contexts in which multiple agencies operate.

Although definitions are contested, countries considered as fragile states (Box 1) or in protracted crisis (Box 2) are extreme examples of situations where water supply service delivery tends to be undertaken by nonstate actors including private enterprises, NGOs, and citizens themselves. Governments usually play a weak role in service provision, oversight or regulation. Donors and NGOs step in, often leading to more fragmentation and the perpetuation of undermining the development of country systems. However, if countries are to fulfil their obligations of the right to water and sanitation, and meet the SDG targets, the strong role of the state is imperative.

Water governance, equitable distribution, and protection are one of humankind's most difficult tasks and a test for every society and political regime.

BOX 1: DEFINITIONS OF A 'FRAGILE STATE'

According to the OECD (2012), "*a fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic **governance** functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive **relations with society**. Fragile regions or states are also more vulnerable to internal or external **shocks** such as economic crises or natural disasters…. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum*". Classifications vary:

- The World Bank/African Development Bank "*Harmonized List of Fragile Situations*" (Anon-World Bank, 2015) focuses on state functions and policies[3] and the presence of political or peace building/keeping missions.
- The Fund for Peace[4] Fragile States Index considers political, human, and civil rights (Messner et al. 2015).
- The OECD (2015) recognized the diversity of risks and vulnerabilities that lead to fragility with respect to: violence; access to justice for all; effective, accountable and inclusive institutions; and economic foundations and capacity to adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters.

A large number of countries have been considered as fragile. "*Between 2007 and 2015, 67 countries have been included on at least one fragile states list*" (OECD 2015). Some countries have moved on and off the list, oscillating around the list's cut-off point. Brinkerhoff (2010) notes that although the definitions of fragile states vary, there is agreement that state fragility is directly related to capacity deficits, with the governments of fragile states incapable of assuring basic security for their citizens. They fail to "*provide basic services and economic opportunities and are unable to garner sufficient legitimacy to maintain citizen confidence and trust*". For example, "*only 28 percent of fragile states are on track to halve the number of their citizens without access to safe water, while 61 percent of nonfragile [developing] countries have reached this target*" (OECD 2015).

BOX 2: DEFINITIONS OF A 'PROTRACTED CRISIS'

Harmer and Macrae (2004) define a protracted crisis as "*environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity to respond to, and mitigate, the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection".* With protracted crises, there is an

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[3] Countries that are above the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) cut-off rating of 3.2 are put on the harmonized list.
[4] Washington-based organization: http://global.fundforpeace.org/aboutus

emphasis on understanding and addressing longer-term issues and multiple causes (High-Level Expert Forum 2012).

There is no simple mechanism for categorization, but *"food insecurity and malnutrition are common prevalent features"* (Pingali et al. 2005)*.* The FAO (2010 and 2015) has drawn together measureable criteria for classifying countries in protracted crisis based on: the longevity of the crisis,[5] the proportion of total assistance to a country that is humanitarian[6] and a country's economic and food security status.[7] There were 22 and 20 countries that met all three criteria in 2010 and 2015, respectively (FAO 2010; and FAO 2015). Some countries narrowly miss inclusion in the list.

The challenge of meeting the WASH SDGs is thus further complicated by multiple agencies—from international to national to local to private enterprises and water users—that share responsibilities to finance, plan, implement projects, sustain and regulate water and sanitation services and bring about behavior change. To succeed, all stakeholders need to play their part and complement each other, with the state becoming stronger in the process. Coordination and accountability are extremely important. Fragile states, countries in protracted crisis and those where fragmented donor support bypasses government systems[8] face particular challenges, that is:

1. Mechanisms for accountability are weak or nonexistent.
2. There is a poor evidence base for decision making.
3. Communication is poor and exchange of information on plans, investments, programs, and priorities is lacking.
4. Multiple stakeholders do their own thing, do not trust each other, and there is a poor team spirit.
5. Citizen confidence in government is lacking, and government staff lack confidence in themselves.

In such contexts, effective JSR processes are extremely important. They can help to overcome these constraints. The Nepal JSR study (Danert and Karki 2016), for example, found that the two WASH JSRs (2011 and 2014) and related sector coordination have significantly contributed to improving communication and trust, as well as creating a team spirit. The JSRs also reinforced the understanding of the role of the state, and of the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) in particular.

2.3   Underlying Causes

There is need to understand *"what is really driving behavior and development outcomes in poor countries and fragile states"* **(IDS 2010).**

Countries that are considered as fragile or in protracted crisis are diverse, and may have suffered:
- One or more human-induced emergencies, for instance:
    - conflict (overt, covert, militarized or violent),
    - political crisis,
    - economic shocks such as financial crises or price increases, and
    - influx or exodus of refugees.
- One or more natural-induced or climate related disasters.
- A combination of the above.

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[5] The longevity criteria: a country is considered to be in a protracted crisis if it appears on the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) for eight years or more out of the last 10 years.
[6] Aid flow criteria: a country is considered as being in protracted crisis if it has received 10 percent or more of its official development assistance (ODA) as humanitarian aid over the past 10 years.
[7] Countries appear on the FAO's list of low-income food-deficit countries.
[8] Or creates new government agencies, departments or units.

One crisis factor may trigger another, such as the removal of subsidies leading to social upheaval and political violence,[9] natural disasters exacerbating political unrest and violent conflict (for example, Sahel and West Africa region), or competition over scarce natural resources for food security.[10] Armed conflict can be a symptom as well as a cause of protracted crisis, and natural and human-induced disasters can lead to political instability.[11] Long-term underlying problems can be exacerbated by crisis.[12] "*In some cases, protracted crisis situations are limited to a particular geographic area within a country and thus may not affect the entire population*"[13] (FAO 2010).

Inadequate or costly water supplies, as well as water resources pollution or depletion, can cause disputes and even lead to violent conflict. Insufficient access to water can cause migration. Recent disputes include Cochabamba (Bolivia) water supply privatization riots, the uprisings over the pollution of the Niger Delta, and armed conflict between pastoralists over scarce water resources in parts of Ethiopia and Kenya. Recent responses to such disputes include the emerging field of water diplomacy, which uses water disagreements as a starting point to find mutual interest and work towards collaboration and peace. In water diplomacy, the skills and competencies of the diplomatic body are coupled with scientific understanding of water to prevent or deter conflict and promote cooperation.

The duration of fragility or protracted crises means that many institutions and support systems that provide the foundations of society break down. This can lead to increasing levels of conflict between different segments of society, further fueling crisis. Context-responsive responses are required to respond to a diversity of situations (ICRC 2015). However, the fundamental problem of reforming how development assistance is delivered in emergencies and protracted crises has yet to be addressed (Mosel and Levine 2014).

Nevertheless, major events can create opportunities. The 2014/15 Ebola crisis in West Africa helped to reinforce the strategic importance of the WASH sector in Liberia, helped reinforce communication and cooperation between government ministries, international organizations and NGOs (Government of Liberia 2015). In Nepal the WASH cluster, with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in the lead, played a key role in the early aftermath of the April 2015 earthquake, before gradually handing over to ongoing, government-led coordination mechanisms established as part of the JSR. It has been stated that the earthquake actually strengthened these (Danert and Karki 2016).

2.4   How Development Assistance is Delivered

Conceptually, aid architecture tends to be considered as a continuum of:

- Relief, with an emphasis on saving lives and alleviating suffering—based on humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality, for example, water trucked to schools and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps.
- Recovery, a gray area that tries to create pre- or nonemergency situations—applies development principles as far as humanitarian principles allow. According to Steets et al. (2011), there is a preference to work with local communities and local government.

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[9] For example, bread subsidy removal catalyzing the Arab Spring in 2011 (FAO 2015); rice subsidy removal in 1979 catalyzing the 14-year Liberian civil war (Richey 2010).

[10] For example, farmers and herders in the semi-Arid Sahel and East Africa regions (FAO 2015).

[11] For example, the Haiti earthquake in 2010; and the 1970s and 1980s famines in Ethiopia (High-Level Expert Forum 2012).

[12] For instance, the groundwater depletion in parts of the Middle East pre-dates the current armed conflict (ICRC 2015).

[13] For example, Uganda's crisis in the northern and north eastern part of the country is a case in point.

- Development, which aims to improve the social and economic situation—applies development principles of ownership, alignment, results, and mutual accountability, for instance, reconstruction of urban water supply infrastructure and strengthening of utility capacity.

The idea of a transition from civil war/crisis to peace/development grew from the postcold war experiences in Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Guatemala, that is, negotiated endings to civil wars, peace keeping, and managing a transition from humanitarian aid to renewed development (Jones 2004). This ambition is reflected in the *Agenda for Peace* (UN 1992). The term 'development' tends to be considered as a gradual improvement in the quality of life, which is briefly interrupted by a disaster or acute emergency before returning to a 'normal' upward trend. This view lends itself to use of the term 'recovery' (FA, 2010).

However, a protracted crisis tends to be unpredictable for an extended period, even decades (for instance, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan). Many of the current emergencies have not moved in a predictable and linear manner; conflicts have re-emerged (such as in Burundi, Iraq, South Sudan, Yemen), or the already fragile situation has been exacerbated by natural disasters (as in Liberia [Ebola], Nepal [earthquake], Pakistan [floods], Sierra Leone [Ebola]). There are also many cases of internal conflicts where the state is one party to the conflict.

Despite subsequent failure, the relief-recovery-development conceptualization has remained embedded in subsequent UN concepts and policy debates (Jones 2004). In reality, there are major questions about where the above phases actually start and end, including:

- Some agencies recognize the use of all three simultaneously—referring to a 'contiguum' as opposed to a 'continuum' (Mosel and Levine 2014). The term contiguum refers to hazards, disasters, and so-called stages of postdisaster response overlapping and operating at the same time.
- Many donors and practitioners are moving in a conceptual maze in relation to the above phase distinctions (Steets et al. 2011).
- The ICRC (2015) argues that for essential urban services in areas of protracted armed conflict, the above distinctions are particularly blurred.

In dealing with protracted crises, the High-Level Expert Forum (2012) recommends a combination of both humanitarian and development assistance. The year 2015 witnessed a renewed call by UNICEF to "*destroy the development-emergency dichotomy*" by closing the gap between WASH humanitarian and development assistance (Wijesekera 2015), and to break down the arbitrary boxes the world has created for "development" and "humanitarian" action (Lake 2015). The FAO (2015) is also calling for action to integrate humanitarian and development assistance. Calls for an overhaul of the relief-reconstruction-development concept already span two decades (Duffield 1994; Keen 2007; and Mosel and Levine 2014). Nevertheless, questions remain about how to put these calls into practice, and what should be done at an operational level.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a set of principles for engagement in fragile states (OECD 2007) covering: context-specificity; do not harm

A government staff survey in Fiamah. (Liberia - WSP/UNICEF support to 2014 JSR).

concerns; state-building as a central objective; prioritizing prevention/risk reduction; recognizing political, security and development links; and promoting nondiscrimination. However, the FAO (2010) argues that the practicalities of these operating principles are not clear enough. The High-Level Expert Forum (2012) recommends learning what works best from each protracted crisis individually. In the case of responses to food security in protracted crises, the FAO (2010) argues that impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation systems, and learning and accountability mechanisms—all need to be strengthened. These are all central aspects of effective JSRs.

2.5   A Plethora of Solutions and Realities

Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals[14] were endorsed by conflict affected and fragile countries, development partners, and civil society (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011). The OECD (2015) notes that aid budgets are still adapting to these goals, and there is no agreed framework to track aid to support them. "*It will take time to build the institutions needed to underpin new development goals…[but] the pace of institution building will need to accelerate…under a business as usual projection only two [fragile] countries would have "acceptable" institutional quality by 2030*" (OECD, 2015). There is *"clear evidence that fragile states do not receive support commensurate with their needs"* (Steets et al., 2011). Building institutions, despite limited support, requires creativity, which can be nurtured through collaboration and joint learning.

To reduce fragility, the OECD (2015) calls for national ownership, international commitment, and innovation.[15] Donor and NGO support of nationally owned and led plans as well as more flexibility and tolerance by donors of on-budget aid modalities that build national institutions. The 'Collaborative Behaviors' set out by 'Sanitation and Water for All' echoes this with a call for government leadership of planning and use of country processes (SWA 2015). Multisectoral efforts are needed to: reduce violence, build trust in government, and improve the quality of public services (OECD 2015). Drinking water is generally considered a key public service. Improving its accessibility, quality, and reliability is one way of building trust in government, and of reducing conflict and even violence.

In the context of state fragility, emergence conflict or protracted crisis, there is also a significant capacity conundrum. A conundrum is a problem or puzzle which is difficult or impossible to solve. The lack of infrastructure and institutional capacity within the country, coupled with urgency of donor organizations for results, tends to result in government agencies being bypassed in favor of alternative systems and nonstate actors (WSP, forthcoming). Alas, this way of working is unlikely to raise government capacity. Weak capacity thus becomes even more entrenched, policy dialogue does not take place and there is a vicious circle.

In extreme cases (notably Liberia and South Sudan), NGOs and UN agencies can end up effectively managing the country (WSP, forthcoming) and implementing most WASH implementation. Clearly, this is not desirable. Unfortunately, in the case of a protracted crisis, what was a short-term solution can become a long-term reality. By encouraging service delivery by UN agencies and NGOs, and continuing to support this over years, or even decades, the skill base of government is further and further weakened. This makes it even more difficult to build capacity, or support institutions in the future.

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[14] **Goals: Legitimate Politics:** Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution; **Security:** Establish and strengthen people's security; **Justice:** Address injustices and increase people's access to justice; **Economic Foundations:** Generate employment and improve livelihoods; and **Revenues and Services:** Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

[15] For example, for domestic revenue generation, south-south and triangular cooperation, and to attract foreign direct investment.

"How can we learn how public financial management processes work if we do not have our own project funds to manage?"
Honorable Shukri Haji Ismail, Minister of Environment and Rural Development, Somaliland (Richey 2015)

When public services deteriorate or weaken, people turn to their own initiatives to fulfil their needs. Those who can afford it may call on the private sector to fill the gap (ICRC 2015). Local initiatives and institutions can be effective and resilient in situations that are otherwise chaotic, but are often ignored by humanitarian aid and development organizations (FAO 2010). There is evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan of informal socioeconomic and institutional arrangements developing during a protracted crisis or in response to it. Such arrangements have fostered self-reliance, mobilized communities, engaged in collective action and conflict resolution, and even advocated for change to land laws at national level.

Within WASH, the growth of private boreholes in Nigeria and Chad, as well as emerging associations of drillers, are examples of personal initiatives and local institutions (Danert, Adekile and Canuto 2014; Danert 2015a) Despite the important role that they play, such initiatives may be ignored or overlooked as the state and its donors focus on piped water supplies or new community services. Conflicts can arise as utilities try to charge for (unreliable) piped water supplies to consumers who have already invested in their own alternative sources. In this case, people's own initiatives can make building up a public service even more difficult.

Clothes washed in the river by washer men and women (dhobis) dry in the sun.

PHOTO CREDIT: BHARATPUR, NEPAL, KERSTIN DANERT.

2.6   Capacity

Striking a balance between delivering services and building up government capacity is a difficult. Donors may have concerns about being seen to work too closely with governments that have records of human rights abuses or a perceived lack of commitment to political settlements, and may even pull out of a country

completely due to major political disagreements. However, *"states and government are not monoliths. Even in contexts where the state is predatory, there will usually be parts of the system, or particular institutions, bureaucrats or ministries with which aid actors can work"* (Mosel and Levine 2014).

According to Brinkerhoff (2010), strengthening individual, organizational, and institutional capacity is essential in both fragile and more resilient contexts, but there are differences (Table 1).

TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN FRAGILE AND NONFRAGILE STATES (BRINKERHOFF, 2010)

Applies to nonfragile and fragile states	Applies to fragile states
Need to consider sustainability and reinforcement of endogenous capacity	Pressure to restore services and security quickly
Long timeframe	Short timeframe
Change agents and champions, political will and ownership	Limited capacity to build on
Importance of adaptation of intervention templates	Often not simply rebuilding, but creating new capacities
Systems perspective to capture complexity and interconnections	Little 'margin of error' (for example, lack of trust and social capital, institutional resilience)
-	Hyper-politicized environment

Source: D.W. Brinkerhoff (2010). "Developing Capacity in Fragile States." *Public Administration and Development* **30**, 66-78 [http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/29924/420135/file/Post-Conflict-Economic-Development_30.pdf].

JSRs can help to address some of the constraints in the right-hand column. A regular JSR cycle going on for many years can provide continuity and space for a long-term perspective, even if much of the implementation focus is on the short term. Even if there is limited capacity, it can be built on by bringing those with more experience to the same table as others. Theme-based or area-based groups can be formed to enable individuals to learn from each other, and share the load—something that well-designed JSR processes can foster. With little "margin of error", nonstate actors very quickly point fingers at governments for their inadequacies. Disagreements easily escalate into heated arguments. Trust building is essential, for which JSRs can play an important role.

> **"The characteristics of countries in protracted crisis make them some of the most difficult contexts for the international community to engage with"**
> *FAO (2010)*

There are major obstacles to engaging in situations of ongoing conflict and chronic political and economic crises (Macrae and Harmer 2004). Nevertheless, the international community is being called on to address the critical effects of protracted crises while simultaneously addressing underlying causes such as poor governance, inadequate capacities, limited access to scarce resources and conflict (FAO 2015). In practical terms, we are talking about contexts which suffer from high staff turnover among service providers as well as humanitarian and development workers. In addition to the loss of skills and tacit knowledge, relationships need to be established and then re-established continually (ICRC 2015). In areas suffering from the risk of violent conflict, the development and humanitarian workers face huge logistical and security challenges and, at times, even risk their lives.

Alas, the current metrics used within development to determine program "effectiveness" tend to comprise static, predefined objectives, as set out in input/output based logframes. If these are too rigid and

prescriptive, either the program cannot operate, or there is a danger that those involved will not report the truth anyway. Inflexible metrics do not sit well with the unpredictable and changing situations in fragile states and countries in protracted crisis. Mosel and Levin (2014) recommend program frameworks based on broader theories of change and higher-level objectives that allow for much needed flexibility in recurrent crises.

Programming in fragile states must be flexible enough to adapt to major changes in local circumstances. Reporting and review processes need to incorporate such changes.

This study examines a small but important aspect of this challenge: the extent to which JSR processes for WASH are actually addressing some of the needs in states classified as fragile, suffering from protracted crisis and, more widely, those where many agencies operate. By reflecting on experiences, the study uncovers ways to improve JSR effectiveness.

3 The Joint Sector Review Process

3.1 Origins and Evolution

JSR gatherings have mainly taken place in countries with a high dependence on aid (Packer 2006). They are primarily undertaken for education, health, agriculture, energy, and water. They reflect the collective responsibility of donors and governments for achievement of results. JSR meetings, or gatherings, have their origins in the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp)[16] but are now being undertaken in other contexts. JSRs have also been driven by the 2005 Paris Declaration and 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (Indicator 11: Monitoring and Evaluation reforms) as well as the Busan Partnership for Effective Co-operation (OECD 2011). There is a push for results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks, and the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, and mutual accountability.

JSRs have been considered as the main instrument for assessing progress, resolving issues and reaching agreements (World Ban, 2001). They can *"….satisfy the existing **M&E needs** of various stakeholders while, at the same time, also contributing to the reform agenda"* (Holvoet and Inberg 2009), and *"…provide a **platform** to assess the performance and results of the … sector and in turn assist governments in setting sector policy and priorities"* (Anon 2013). IHP+ (2013) found that JSRs can *"…improve plans, mobilize additional resources and promote mutual **accountability**"*. Today, JSRs are also carried out in contexts without a SWAp, for example, Burundi (Box 3) and Liberia.

Today, Joint Sector Review processes also take place in countries where there is no Sector-Wide Approach, and countries where there are no plans for one.

BOX 3: FIVE YEARS OF JOINT SECTOR REVIEWS IN BURUNDI WITHOUT A SECTOR-WIDE APPROACH

Burundi's water and sanitation expenditure is highly dependent on donor funds, which accounted for 83 percent and 82 percent of expenditure in 2012 and 2013, respectively (see figure at right). Five JSRs have taken place, every year (2010 to 2014) and are government-led, that is, the *Ministère de l'Eau*, *de l'Environnement*, *de l'Aménagement du Territoire et de l'Urbanisme* and the *Ministère de l'Energie et des Mines*. Participation over five years includes staff from: the above ministries, three to five donors, five to 13 nongovernmental organizations, one to three UN agencies (UNICEF was always present), and none to 21 media agencies. Ministries responsible for finance, health, and decentralization participated in 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2014; in 2012 the ministry of health and finance were present. The Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) has played a major role in establishing and supporting JSRs. There is no explicit performance measurement framework but the JSR appears to be part of the annual monitoring process of national water and sanitation strategies. Progress and status of recommendations from the previous JSR are reviewed. Recommendations have been made for the coming year(s). It includes a two-day meeting, with a report circulated after the event.

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
[16] A Sector-Wide Approach is where significant funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure program, under government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and fostering reliance on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds (Foster, 2000);and collective responsibility of donors and governments for achievements in the sector (Holvoet and Inberg, 2009). However, the understanding of SWAps has also evolved and varies between countries and organizations.

3.2 Joint Sector Review Definitions and Practice

There is no standard definition of a JSR. The OECD/DAC (2002) defines a *review* as an assessment of the performance of an intervention, periodically or on an ad hoc basis, and Holvoet and Inberg (2009) note that a review lies between monitoring and evaluation. BTC (2014) defines a 'Joint Sector Review' as "*multiple stakeholders jointly look[ing] at a particular subsector or function… [a] platform for dialogue and engagement*". Holvoet and Inberg (2009) define a 'Joint Sector Review' as a periodic assessment of the performance[17] in a specific sector for donor, government, and nonstate actors' learning, accountability, and reform needs. The ways that JSRs have been considered (Section 4.1) and defined place different emphasis on dialogue and performance assessment aspects.

In practice, the term JSR is used to refer to a regular (usually bi-annual or annual):

- Half-day **meeting** in which the lead sector ministry reports on progress to the ministry of finance.
- Two-day multistakeholder **meeting** comprising presentations where stakeholders tell each other what they are doing, plan to do, hope to do, or should do.
- **Review processes** lasting several weeks or months that bring together different stakeholders and consolidated information, culminating in a meeting which leads to binding commitments, with agreed and clear roles and responsibilities for action. Anything in between the above extremes. Different modalities are possible (Box 4).

JSRs are not static, but rather change and evolve over time, as illustrated by the examples in Box 4.

Box 4: Evolving JSR processes in Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, and Uganda

The 2011 and 2015 Joint Sector Review (JSR) gatherings in **Burkina Faso** were both entitled "National Forum" and prepared for the participation of Burkina Faso at the World Water Forums in Marseille (France) and Daegu-Gyeongbuk (South Korea).

In **Burundi**, the JSR event was shortened from three to two days after the first year.

In **Ethiopia**, the initial intention was for three annual events, that is, two Joint Technical Reviews per year, feeding into an annual Multi-Stakeholder Forum. The reality has been different, with six Forums over nine years, usually preceded by one Joint Technical Review.

For the second and third JSRs in 2014 and 2015 in **Liberia**, a Sector Performance Report was prepared before the JSR meeting, drawing together, presenting and analyzing key data. It was written by the staff members of 10 government agencies with technical support funded by donor agencies.

The first JSR in **Malawi** was held in 2008, and has been held annually since then. Annual Sector Performance Reports have been prepared for the JSR workshop from 2011 onwards.

The procedures of the second review in **Nepal** took about six weeks. Eight thematic groups were formed to brainstorm on thematic areas, draw in learning from field visits, prepare input papers, and make recommendations to be presented and discussed at the review conference (MoUD 2014a).

In **Uganda**, the lead ministry has prepared a Sector Performance Report in advance of the JSR event since 2004 (third JSR). The report takes about three months to prepare and pulls together data from a wide range of sources including national government agencies, local governments, nongovernmental organizations and statistics bureau. Since the fifth review, government staff and political leaders hold a retreat to discuss and adjust the report prior to its finalization and wider circulation for the JSR meeting.

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[17] Performance: inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts, underlying systemic and institutional issues.

3.4   WASH JSR Experience and Typology

Table 2 lists the 25 countries selected for this study, and the years in which JSR gatherings were held. JSRs have taken place in 19 of these, of which 16 were included in an OECD report on fragile states between 2007 and 2015 (OECD 2015, p. 32). From these countries, Uganda started water and sanitation JSRs first in 2001. Ten other counties (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Yemen, and Zambia) started JSR processes between 2006 and 2008. Laos is the most recent country from the sample to start JSR processes, with its first one in 2015.

The experience of JSR gatherings in these 25[18] countries can be grouped into four categories:

- **Mature:** An established cycle, with a decade or more of regular JSR gatherings. Uganda has, by far, had the longest history of JSR meetings, with one or two per year, every year for 15 years since 2001. Given this, it is not surprising that there has been so much interest in learning from the country. Rwanda has 10 years of experience, with the JSR being a formal process for reporting performance to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
- **Intermediate:** An establishing cycle, with five to nine JSR gatherings so far, taking place every year, or sometimes every second year. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia fall into this category. In the case of Burundi, the planned 2015 JSR was postponed, and finally cancelled due to political unrest relating to the president's third term in office.
- **Basic:** Limited experience, with four or less JSR gatherings so far. Within this group, there are three types of countries:
  - **Continuing:** Commitment and ability of government and its partners to the continuation of JSR processes in the future (Laos, Liberia, Nepal, and Sierra Leone).
  - **Discontinued:** JSR gathering discontinued after some time (Ghana, South Sudan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe).
- **No experience** of JSR gatherings (Afghanistan, Indonesia, Jordan and Somalia, Timor-Leste, West Bank and Gaza).

From this data, no specific conclusions can be drawn about whether JSR processes are more likely to become established in a fragile or nonfragile state, or in a country with a protracted crisis.[19] Ghana was not on the OECD list of fragile states between 2007 and 2015 but JSR processes did not continue, whereas there are established cycles in Burundi, Niger and Uganda, all of which have been on a fragile state list. This is perhaps not as surprising as it first appears, given that between 2007 and 2015, 67 countries were included on at least one fragile states list (OECD, 2015 p. 32) and that more countries oscillate around the cut-off point. Despite the presence of UN peace-keeping operations Liberia has managed to hold JSRs for three years, and Kenyan JSRs took place in 2008 despite the postelection violence.

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[18] Notably, several countries without JSRs are on this list. Four (Afghanistan, Indonesia, Jordan, and West Bank and Gaza) are included as they are cited in the GLAAS report (UN-Water 2014) as having had a national assessment within the last two years; Timor-Leste is included due to the extensive (and frequently presented) water point mapping work; Somalia is included due to the interest expressed by the WSP to possibly support a JSR in the future. Indonesia is included as, in 2015, the government hosted the 'International World Water Week'. It was actually focused on national issues, with some invited speakers from overseas. Notably it included many elements of a JSR and has the potential to be adapted into one (Furey 2015).
[19] Further analysis could be undertaken to see if there is any correlation between continuity of JSRs and duration, or extent of fragility or protracted crisis, but this would require a larger sample size.

TABLE 2: NUMBER AND YEAR OF WATER/WASH JSR GATHERINGS[20] FOR 25 SELECT COUNTRIES (JAN 1, 2001, TO DEC 31, 2015)

Country	Fragile State	UN	Protracted Crisis	No. years with JSRs	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
MATURE																			
Rwanda	✓			11					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Uganda	✓		✓	15	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
INTERMEDIATE																			
Burkina Faso	✓			7								✓	✓	✓	①	✓	✓	✓	①
Burundi	✓		✓	5										✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
Ethiopia	✓		✓	6					✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✗
Kenya	✓		✓	9						✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Malawi	✓			8								✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Niger	✓			8								✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Senegal	✓			8					✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
Tanzania				9						✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Zambia				6					✓			✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✗
BASIC (Continuing)																			
Laos PDR	✓			1															✓
Liberia	✓	UN		3											✓			✓	✓
Nepal	✓			2											✓			✓	✗
Sierra Leone	✓		✓	2													✓	✓	✗
BASIC (Discontinued)																			
Ghana				4								✓	✓	✓		✓			✗
South Sudan	✓	UN		4								✓	✓	✓	✓				✗
Yemen	✓			2					✓	✓									✗
Zimbabwe	✓		✓	1											✓				✗
NO EXPERIENCE																			
Afghanistan	✓	UN	✓	0															✗
East Timor	✓			0															✗
Indonesia				0															②
Jordan				0															✗
Somalia	✓			0															✗
West Bank-Gaza	✓			0															✗

KEY

✓ (orange) Country included in one or more of the OECD fragile states reports between 2007 and 2015 (OECD, 2015 pp32)

UN UN peace-keeping operation in the country between 2012 and 2015

✓ (maroon) Country included in the FAO (2010 or 2015) updated list for countries in protracted crisis

✓ One or more JSR gatherings took place in that year   ✗ No JSR in 2015

NOTES

① The 2011 and 2015 meetings in Burkina Faso were both entitled "national Forum" and prepared for the participation of country in the World Water Forums in Marseille, France (2012) and Daegu-Gyeongbuk, South Korea (2015).
② Indonesia International Water Week (2015) had many features of a JSR Gathering.
Technical review meetings (a second review type meeting, or half-yearly meeting) have taken place in Burkina Faso (2013), Ethiopia (some years), South Sudan (2010), Uganda and Rwanda.

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[20] A JSR gathering (meeting/workshop/conference) is referred to locally as the Water Sector Conference (Kenya); Multi-Stakeholder Forum (Ethiopia); Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene (Wash) Conference (Sierra Leone); *Revue Annuelle Conjointe* (Burundi, Niger, Burkina Faso); Bi-Annual Planning and Coordination Meeting (South Sudan); Joint Annual Review (Yemen); Joint Sector Review Workshop (Malawi); Annual Water Sector Review (Kenya), Joint Water Sector Review meeting (Zambia). Technical review meetings, a second review-type meeting or a half-yearly meeting took place in the same year in Burkina Faso (2013), Ethiopia (some years), Rwanda, South Sudan (2010), and Uganda.

Each of the countries with no regular cycle has its own particular story. There are many unanswered questions, but it appears that the commitment by government or its partners to the reviews was not sufficient to continue with them, for example:

- Despite the relatively well-functioning WASH sector in **Ghana** and long-term support by development partners, the Ghana Water Forum processes stopped in 2013, with no indication of restarting. This may be due to the relative weak ministry in comparison to the powerful implementing agencies including Ghana Water Company, Community Water and Sanitation Agency, the Water Resources Commission, and an independent multiutility regulator. These strong drivers in the sector may not have interest in JSRs and prefer the bi-lateral reviews that are carried out. Would Ghana benefit from a Joint Sector Review?

- The most recent JSR in **South Sudan** was in 2012. According to government sources, resuming the process has been very difficult following the outbreak of hostilities within the country in late 2013. Another informant suggests that the displacement of the government from its posts, general instability, development partners' leaving, and a focus on humanitarian assistance may have undermined the regularity of the JSR process.

- **Yemen** held two Joint Annual Reviews (2006 and 2007). Documents are available online for the 2006 review. It is not clear why the Joint Annual Review process did not continue after 2007 despite the fact that reforms of urban water continued and were reported on up to 2011 (UNWATER 2011).

- **Zimbabwe** held one Joint Sector Review in November 2011 with financial support from UNICEF and the WSP. It followed on from the 'Nyanga meeting' among four ministries with water portfolios in February 2010. The 2011 review report is very upbeat about a regular process engaging different agencies managing water and sanitation and includes an implementation matrix with some costings. Sadly, no other review has taken place subsequently. "*Due to financial and logistical problems it has not been held. The spirit to hold it is certainly there*" (Mutazu 2015).

4 Relevance and Impact of Joint Sector Reviews

4.1 Relevance

The study defined relevance of a JSR as the extent to which the JSR's objectives were consistent with WASH sector stakeholders' perceptions of needs within the historical context as well as the socioeconomic, political, policy, institutional, programmatic and project environment at the time. In other words, was the JSR worth doing? Were the JSR objectives focused on the right priorities?

Objectives for the JSRs are explicitly set out for most countries (Table 3). They tend to be fairly general and concerned with:

- Analyzing progress; taking stock of achievements and status; and taking a critical look.
- Providing an overview of the sector.
- Stakeholder platform and consensus-building.

Interviewees perceive these objectives as highly relevant, placing much emphasis on the important role of JSRs in bringing stakeholders together. In countries where a JSR process is new, it has provided the opportunity for individuals working in different agencies to meet for the first time, and likewise for NGO/CSO staff to meet with government officials. In some countries, the JSR process and gathering has been cited as paving the way, or providing the only opportunity for NGO staff, to have face-to-face discussions with government representatives on a range of topics.

Stakeholders interviewed for the study all particularly appreciated the actual JSR gathering for bringing stakeholders together. In several countries, including Nepal, it is not the gathering itself but the entire JSR process that has been highly appreciated in this regard (Box 5). It is a way of dealing with multiple donors, many NGOs, and government fragmentation. The process in the build-up to the JSR gathering (depending on how it is done) as well as the gathering itself brings stakeholders into much needed informal and formal networks. These networks are essential to foster the collaboration which is vital in contexts of fragility and protracted crisis.

BOX 5: VALUE OF THE JSR PROCESS TO STAKEHOLDERS IN NEPAL

We need JSRs because of the donors. If funding and implementation was done by one ministry, it would not be necessary.

The JSR is needed because there are many foreign actors and the government fragmentation is unmanageable for the donors.

The first JSR shed light for government on innovative and promising approaches by NGOs.

"We now have a platform to discuss and understand each other"; "The JSR brings you closer"; "JSR brought stakeholders onto one platform to discuss properly".

"Before, NGOs were always blaming government" and *"nobody knew what everyone else is doing".*

"The thematic group concept is very good. It brings innovated ideas together, those isolated come together and can compare".

(*Source:* Danert and Karki 2015).

TABLE 3: EXAMPLES OF OBJECTIVES OF JOINT SECTOR REVIEW MEETINGS

Country	Stated Objectives
Burundi	Analytical tool for the progress and performance of the sector (investment, infrastructure management, and the implementation of sectoral policy). Allowed understanding industry advancements by making an analysis of interventions and outcomes in 2013 and giving the overview of expenditure forecasts for 2014. Platform for all stakeholders to discuss and develop recommendations to provide clear guidelines for the development future of the sector (MEEATU 2014). Note that the objectives are stated in terms of what the review did rather than what it set out to do.
Ghana	Create stakeholder platform to review strategies, opportunities, and challenges for long-term sustainability of water facilities; policy review; stocktaking of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) achievements; building consensus and providing recommendations for consideration at the highest political level, formulating policies, strategies and actions to ensure the sustainability of services (MoWRW, 2011).
Sierra Leone	- To take stock of the general status and coverage of WASH deliverables in Sierra Leone with regard to the MDGs and to put strategies in place to achieve these targets. - To evaluate the current status of WASH in Sierra Leone and to identify the gaps in WASH service delivery. - Critically look at the current status of institutional, legislative, and regulatory reforms. - Provide a platform wherein sector players, water professionals, and other actors can interact to identify challenges in the sector as well as come up with solutions on the way forward (MWR 2014).
Tanzania	"*review implementation of the Water and Sanitation Development Programme, including status of various planned activities implemented under the program … and provide guidance to the water sector by identifying the priority sector interventions*" (MoW 2014a).
Yemen	Although there are no specific objectives in the reports, the *Aid Mémoire* sets out an intention to "*verify the NWSSIP partners' continued commitments to the national strategy based in a transparent and participatory assessment of strengths and weaknesses, and to inform all stakeholders about crucial developments and challenges*" (Republic of Yemen 2006).
Zambia	"*To assess achievements, identify weaknesses and formulate lessons learnt and recommendations for decision-making and future actions*" (Anon-Zambia 2014).

4.2   Impact

This study did not explicitly set out to analyze the impact of WASH JSR processes. However, this section sheds some light on three key questions and provides some illustrative examples of JSRs' impact in the context of fragility and protracted crisis.

Firstly, what evidence has been found that JSRs contribute to the Paris Declaration principles of ownership, harmonization, alignment, managing for results, and mutual accountability? JSR processes are highly valued by stakeholders but they are not a panacea for solving everything. The study findings suggest that a clear, structure and well-communicated JSR process—whereby multiple stakeholders consolidate data and pool experiences and ideas—can foster ownership of agreed actions to move forward.

Further research is required to draw firm conclusions about how JSR processes contribute to the Paris Declaration principles of harmonization, alignment, and managing for results. The study found that JSR processes are highly nuanced, vary considerably between countries, and are dynamic, changing over time.

In countries where multiple donors are financing WASH and are not providing general budget support, JSRs are one of the few mechanisms that can bring about mutual accountability at country level. However, the lack of publication of sector performance reports that feed into JSRs or of the proceedings and follow-up actions produced from them undermines this. Online JSR documentation was only available for seven out of 19 countries where JSRs have taken place and it was only constantly published on government websites in four countries. While there are some very good examples, in general, the data, presentation, and referencing of JSR reports needs to be much more rigorous. This lack of transparency and weak reporting occurs despite the participation and support of JSRs and the WASH sector by numerous organizations that lead WASH internationally. The study concludes that WASH JSR contribution to mutual accountability can be demonstrated in only a few countries, despite the potential to do otherwise.

Secondly, what about achievement of the priority actions? This is clearly a challenge in many countries. Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia are examples of countries where a number of ambitious priority actions[21] have not been achieved, even after several years on the JSR radar (Table 4).

On the other hand, some priority actions have been achieved, and issues that are not explicitly set as priority actions are also being addressed. Whether the priority actions were actually achievable in the first place or even measurable are important questions being asked by in-country stakeholders, for example:

1. Lengthy undertakings spanning multiple years have been noted in Kenya (MEWNR 2014), with some never getting off the ground and others implemented inconsistently and most poorly aligned to the sector's budgeting and funding process, or poorly linked to existing planning documents. Poor communication and assigning responsibility to relevant implementing agencies is also noted. Kenya wants to *"restructure the approach used to identify and plan the sector undertakings to conform to sector financing based on investment plans which can be monitored and prioritize all the currently ongoing undertakings in light of relevance to the achievement of Vision 2030 and water sector objectives"* (MEWNR 2014).
2. In Burundi, there was often only one monitoring session just a couple of weeks prior to the next JSR but no regular follow-up over time to ensure proper implementation. Despite being a major recommendation of almost all JSRs to provide a national budget line for sector coordination, including the preparation and implementation of JSR, this has never been realized. Nevertheless, donor agencies found government agents directly responsible for organizing the large JSR gathering to be highly motivated and quite experienced.

TABLE 4: ANALYSIS OF PRIORITIES SET THROUGH JOINT SECTOR REVIEWS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Year	Type of Priorities	Comments
Burkina Faso	2013	Priority measures and urgent recommendations	Of the 10 priority measures that were set at the 2012 review, none were achieved by the 2013 review and only one out of four urgent recommendations set at the 2012 review was achieved. The 2013 *Aide-Mémoire* (MEAHA 2013) attributes this to the complexity of the measures, difficulty to mobilize actors, weak oversight between ministries, and inadequate financial resources.
Burundi	2014	Recommendations	The JSRs in Burundi always identify recommendations for sector development, but monitoring of their implementation remains a challenge. Despite being a major recommendation of almost all JSRs to provide a national budget line for sector coordination, including JSR, this has never been realized.

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[21] See the glossary for the different terms used.

	Year	Type of Priorities	Comments
Ethiopia	2014	Undertakings	Analysis of Ethiopia's undertakings for the six reviews from 2006 reveals that the four to nine undertakings set per year are very ambitious and wide in scope.
Ghana	2013	Recommendations	–
Liberia	2015	Recommended priority actions	The 2015 JSR set out 13 recommended priority actions to be finalized at the next WASH Coordination meeting (Hall 2015).
Malawi	2014	Undertakings	There has been a proliferation of undertakings in Malawi since 2012. Thirty undertakings were set through the 2012 and 2013 JSRs and were reported on in the 2014 workshop report (Anon-Malawi, no date). Adding on the new undertakings set at the 2014 JSR workshop, there are now more than 40. The number and reporting structure makes it quite difficult to monitor progress in the sector but, more importantly, the lack of government finance for Water and Irrigation (MoAI and WD 2014) makes implementation very difficult.
Niger	2015	Recommendations	Twenty recommendations were set. The 20th is the continuation of the implementation of the 39 recommendations set out in the 2014 review.
South Sudan	2012	Recommendations	Four succinct, clear recommendations were set in 2012 (Anon-South Sudan 2012a). Keynote remarks for the closing of the 2012 meeting briefly indicate progress on 10 actions points that were noted at the previous meeting.
Sierra Leone	2014	Way forward/ commitments	The study team collected two versions of the statement of outcomes of the second WASH Conference in 2014. One statement (not authored) refers to detailed "commitments". MWR 2014) sets out four commitments.
Tanzania	2013	Undertakings	All eleven undertakings were phrased in the form of activities, rather than outputs, or outcomes (MoW 2014b).
Uganda	2015	Undertakings	Of the 14 undertaking of the 2014 JSR, four were achieved and six partly achieved. It should be noted that most undertakings stretch over two to three years, so the first year will be undertakings which can be achieved without additional funding, and the second and third years after funding have been secured. Lack of achievement is often due to insufficient or late release of funding for the committed activities.
Yemen	2006	None	There are no priorities set in the *Aid Mémoire* (Republic of Yemen 2006). Some of the seven input papers provide recommendations (about 10 per paper) that were not reflected in the *Aid Mémoire* which summarizes implementation, states weaknesses, and mentions some issues that ought to be addressed.
Zambia	2014	Recommendations	Thirty recommendations were set at the 2014 review (Anon-Zambia 2014). Notably, the number of recommendations from the previous reviews had accumulated to 74, of which 15 were reported as fully done, 27 as partially done, 27 as not done and five without data (Anon-Zambia 2014). The 2014 review noted that 74 recommendations is a large amount, and recommended that they be streamlined down to 30.

Declarations of priority actions have been signed in several countries. Committing them to paper or signing them is not been enough to ensure that they are carried out. Taking priority actions forward is a major challenge in most countries. Frustration with this aspect of the JRSs was raised repeatedly by all of those interviewed.

> **"Where the JSR process fell down was the follow-up".**
> *Study interviewee*

Realistic planning in the build-up to the gathering and afterwards seems to be difficult in most countries. Neither is it always easy to identify who is responsible for each action agreed and to systematically follow-up priority actions on a regular basis. In some countries, the priorities set are only looked at a few weeks before

the next JSR gathering. Ideas on how to improve the likelihood of the priority actions being achieved are described in Chapters 6 and 7. One important aspect is that if there are funding requirements, a priority action is unlikely to be completed in one year anyway. Also, each crisis (whether violent conflict, Ebola, a natural disaster or the influx of refugees) distracts attention and diverts limited resources away from addressing long-term structural problems (such as a lack of clear policies, conflicting mandates or persistently poor quality implementation). One of the central arguments given for undertaking a JSR process is that it enables stakeholders to commit to address such issues, even if they take many years to achieve.

> **"The characteristics of countries in protracted crisis make them some of the most difficult contexts for the international community to engage with".**
> *FAO (2010)*

Finally, what else have JSRs contributed to? JSRs do not take place in a vacuum, but are part of the wider national (and international) context. The history, cultures and socioeconomic and political context within a country, as well as outside perceptions and media attention, vary enormously and can suddenly change. Each fragile state or country suffering from protracted crisis is unique. What they tend to have in common is varying degrees of weak institutions and conflicts, trauma, and a tendency towards antagonistic relationships and even fear. As noted in Section 2.5, there are also impressive examples of local organizations emerging for self-reliance. While these aspects affect review processes, there is also evidence that WASH JSR processes provide the space to form relationships and build confidence.

Although there are questions about attribution, documented, or stated examples of impact of JSRs include:

1. Realization or strengthening of synergies, including better division of labor: In Nepal, UNICEF is financing the preparation of a Sector Development Plan, and the World Bank has taken on the Sector Financing Strategy.
2. Increased, or changes to, sector investments: Joint Sector Review Processes in Uganda led to a revision of budget allocation between local governments to raise access to improved water supplies in areas with low coverage (Ssozi and Danert 2012).
3. National programs realized or improved: Ethiopia's Multi-Stakeholder Forums seem to have influenced the establishment of the One WaSH National Program (Sector-Wide Approach) (Girma and Suominen 2013).
4. Changes to institutional structures: Liberia's JSR, particularly the involvement of the Ministry of Finance in the process, contributed to the establishment of the position of a WASH director within the Ministry of Finance, which has been filled (reported by two study interviewees); in Nepal, two new units in the Department for Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Urban Development, were established in line with the thematic groups on functionality and disaster risk reduction and climate change.
5. Improved capacity of government staff and ministries in data compilation, analysis, and reporting as well as clearly articulating and discussing key policy issues (notably Uganda, Nepal, Liberia, and Malawi).
6. Raised profile of WASH within the country: the 'advocacy function' of the JSR (study interviewees from Liberia and Malawi).

The study tried to examine the legal and institutional context for WASH for the 25 countries covered and see whether this has a bearing on the JSR process, or vice versa. However, verifying what was in place was extremely difficult, and it became clear that just as with the term JSR, there are different interpretations of terms like policy, strategy, plan, and SWAp. Further, just because something exists does not mean that it is

of high quality, sufficiently relevant to the context. Appendix 5 includes information on the legal and institutional context for a few countries. Several interviewees raised concerns about the lack of government tools, capacities, and responsibility to fulfil mandates as well as overlap. Capacity development in fragile contexts is difficult (Table 1). Further, some fragmentation may have been triggered by donor agencies choosing to fund one agency rather than another, or of pushing government to set up new entities.

5   Joint Sector Review Effectiveness

5.1   Joint Sector Review Reporting

The GLAAS report 2014 (UN-Water 2014) states that 76 countries conducted a national assessment for WASH such as JSRs within the last four years. At times, this figure has been used to state the number of countries holding WASH JSRs. However, closer examination of the GLAAS questionnaire data, as well as consultation with in-country stakeholders, shows that not all of these 'national assessments' actually resemble JSR processes or gatherings (including Afghanistan, Indonesia, Jordan, and West Bank and Gaza).

Arguably, the GLAAS question is wider than whether a JSR process took place or not. If it is to examine JSRs specifically, the GLAAS process could be improved. This would mean clearly defining what a JSR process is, sharpening the survey question and triangulating evidence that JSRs have actually taken place, including publishing whether the documentation is available online in the actual GLASS report. Notably, such a process is human-resource intensive, as illustrated by this study.

Only four countries (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Nepal, and Uganda) have consistently published their reports on a government website. Some JSR documentation was available online for Kenya, Senegal, and Yemen. Appendix 1 summarizes the information sources for the countries covered by the study. The thousands of downloads of Uganda's Water and Environment Sector Performance report from the Ministry of Water and Environment website provide an indication of the demand for such documentation. The lack of available information in the public domain makes studies such as these very difficult. It also means that knowledge of JSR processes and key issues under discussion remains fragmented, anecdotal, and thus perfect for rumors.

Reports of the JSR procedures followed have been published for Liberia (Danert et al. 2014) and Nepal (MoUD 2014a) and have been documented for Uganda (Ssozi and Danert 2012). Girma and Suominen (2013) published a review of sector collaboration in Ethiopia which included the JSR. These all provide useful insights as well as ideas for improvement for other countries.

NGOs and CSOs have joined hands and prepared their own consolidated WASH reports in Kenya (KEWASNET 2014), Tanzania (TAWASANET 2009 and 2013), and Uganda (UWASNET 2015). These reports provide other voices and perspectives and are important JSR documents. In Nepal, the Federation of Water and Sanitation Users (FEDWASUN) also prepares an annual report.[22]

5.2   Measuring Effectiveness

The effectiveness of WASH JSRs can be measured by considering the achievement of the JSR objectives, accountability, in particular mutual accountability, and agreement of priority actions. These aspects are set out for each country in Table 5, and are summarized here.

1.   The JSR achieves its set **objectives:** Documented, set objectives for the JSR were found for less than half of the 19 countries covered. Due to resource limitations, the study could not examine whether these objectives were actually met.
2.   The JSR enables stakeholders to be held **accountable** for their decisions, actions, and achievement of set priorities (that is, mutual accountability and public scrutiny of expenditure, outputs, and progress) through:
     a.   Representation—in general there is wide representation at the JSR gathering, although who participated cannot always be verified from the documentation.

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[22] This report, which is written in Nepali, was not reviewed for this study.

b. Information on expenditure, outputs, and status for WASH in JSR documentation—only half of the countries provide information on expenditure, outputs, and status of WASH through their JSRs.

c. Availability of JSR documentation online—there is a distinct lack of online publication of JSR documentation.

3. Stakeholders agree to future **priority actions:**

a. As evidenced by agreed minutes or equivalent—most countries have to come up with recommendations or set priorities.

b. Binding commitments are set—very few countries have binding commitments (sometimes referred to as undertakings), even though there may be a signed declaration, or aide-mémoire. Uganda seems to be a notable exception.

While trying to be objective, the above indicators do not do justice to the nuances of the JSR process. Section 4.1 notes that stakeholders consider the JSR process as highly relevant, despite frustrations at the challenges of moving forward with the agreed priority actions. The rest of this chapter examines these nuances by unpacking the JSR process.

Delegates of the second Joint Government of Uganda/Donor Water and Sanitation Sector Review 2002.

PHOTO CREDIT: MOGENS MECHTA.

TABLE 5: EVIDENCE OF JSR PROCESS EFFECTIVENESS

Criteria				Objectives	Accountability						Priorities		
Country	Category	No. of Years of JSRs	JSR Year	Explicitly Set	Wide Representation at JSR Gathering	JSR Documentation Presents Information on: Expenditure	Outputs	Status	Reports Online Sector Report	Gathering	No. of Recommendations	No. of Agreed Actions, Commitments or Undertakings	Binding Commitments
Burkina Faso	Intermediate	7	2013	✗	✔	✔	✔	✔	-	✔	-	10	✗
Burundi	Intermediate	5	2014		✔	✔	✔	✔	✗	✗	22	0	✗
Ethiopia	Intermediate	6	2013	✔	✔					✗		4-9 per year	
Ghana	Basic	4	2013		✔	-	-	-	✗	✗	27	0	✗
Liberia	Basic	3	2015	✗	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✗	13	0	✗
Kenya	Intermediate	9	2015	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✗	✗	5	34	
Malawi	Intermediate	8	2014	✗	✔	✔	✔	✔	✗	✗	-	21-28 (2012 - 2014)	✗
Nepal	Basic	2	2014		✔	✔	✗	✔	✔	✔			✔
Niger	Intermediate	8	2015		✔				✗	✗	20 (+ 39)	0	✗
Senegal	Intermediate	8	2014			✔	✔	✔	✔	✗	-	0	-
South Sudan	Basic	4	2012	✔	✔					✗	3		✗
Sierra Leone	Basic	2	2013			✔	✗	✔	✗	✗			
Sierra Leone	Basic	2	2014	✔	✔	-	-	-	✗	✗	37	4	✗
Tanzania	Intermediate	9	2014	✔		✔				✗			
Uganda	Mature	15	2005 – 2015	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔			✔
Yemen	Basic	2	2006							✔	-	-	✗
Yemen	Basic	2	2007							✗	-	-	✗
Zambia	Intermediate	6	2014	✔		✗	✗	✗	-	✗	30	-	✗
Zimbabwe	Basic	1	2011	✔	✔	✗	✗	✗	-	✗	4 (+21)		✗

- Not applicable.
Note: Blanks mean that the study was not able to find written conclusive evidence either way.

5.3   The Joint Sector Review Process

As noted in Section 3.2, there is no standard definition of a JSR. Examination of the JSRs covered by the study revealed five broad aspects of the process up to and including the gathering (Table 6). The extent to which these are applied in the different countries is summarized in Appendix 4 and discussed here. Uganda's application of all of them is striking and may reflect the maturity of the process. However, Rwanda, with its 10 years of experience, seems to do things quite differently (Box 6). There does not seem to be a pattern as to which aspects are considered in countries at an intermediate or basic stage. Different aspects are taken into consideration and JSRs evolve in different ways. This reinforces a point that we reiterate in Chapter 7: you cannot introduce ready-made solutions into developing countries and simply bypass the process (Andrews 2012).

BOX 6: RWANDA'S JOINT SECTOR REVIEW

In **Rwanda**, the Ministry of Infrastructure leads a JSR (MINIFRA 2014), for which the outcomes are reported in a statement co-signed by the Chair of the Water Supply and Sanitation working group (Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Infrastructure) and the Co-Chair (in 2014, the Chief Representative from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, JICA) and sent to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance. The JSR in Rwanda appears to be a formal process for reporting performance of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (2013–2018) to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Each ministry has its own JSR event (MINCEFOFIN 2014), but it is not clear if there is any cross-ministerial input into these meetings. As the time slot given is only half a day, the meeting itself would appear not to allow exhaustive stakeholder engagement.

TABLE 6: DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF JSR PROCESSES UP TO AND INCLUDING THE GATHERING

Aspect	Explanation
Leadership and participation	Is the JSR led by a sector ministry, and if so, which one?
	Do a broad range of state and nonstate actors participate in the JSR?
	Is there cooperation by the lead donor agency (if there is one)?
Review procedures followed	Is there a regular cycle, for example, six months, one or two years?
	Is there some pregathering preparation which lasts a few weeks to a few months?
	Does the JSR review the priority actions set at the previous JSR?
	Does the JSR include a review of a strategy or work plan?
	Does the JSR include a review of indicators and against targets?
Scope of JSR, reports, and information used	What topics are included? Which aspects of WASH are considered? Is it wider than WASH?
	Does the JSR draw on primary and secondary data and studies?
	Is data and information consolidated into one report prior to the gathering?
	Does the data collection involve monitoring visits to the field?
	Is there a JSR gathering report?
JSR gathering	Does the JSR include a gathering such as a meeting, conference or forum?
	Are field visits undertaken as part of the gathering?
Priorities set	Are priority actions[23] set through the JSR process?

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[23] See the glossary for the different terms used.

Leadership

In 16 of the 19 countries with WASH JSRs, documentation states that the JSR process is led by one government ministry. In three countries (Burundi, Lao, and Yemen), it was jointly led by two ministries. A full list of the ministries taking the lead is provided in Appendix 2.

However, while *"government may be in the driving seat, donors may be pushing and guiding the JSR"* (interviewee). In the early days of a JSR, particularly when there is skepticism about its value, champions (both outside and within government) can play a key leadership and inspirational role. Section 5.4 examines this aspect in more detail. In Uganda, Liberia, and Nepal, the units tasked with coordination of WASH stakeholders and leading the JSR processes were within the lead ministry, but initially financed by donors (DANIDA, UNICEF, and the Asian Development Bank, respectively). This may also be the case in other countries, and is a topic that would benefit from further analysis.[24] In Malawi, the JSR process has now become an integral activity within the Ministry of Water and Agriculture.

Participation

In general, the JSR gatherings were attended by between 100 and 300 people with wide representation by: national government agencies, local governments, NGOs/civil society, donors, and UN agencies. The 2015 Burkina Faso Forum was held as preparation for the 2015 World Water Forum in South Korea and was unusually large (with 650 participants including citizens and artists). Nepal has representation of Water User Committees through its Federation of Drinking Water and Sanitation Users Nepal (FEDWASUN), which seems to be quite unique in comparison with other countries. Across the board, there appears to be less participation of the private sector and academia compared to other stakeholder groups. Noting the importance of the informal private sector in service delivery (Section 2.5), their limited participation may be a missed opportunity.

Media participation varies between countries and years. Interviewees claim that media participation at the Liberia JSR is reported to have raised civic awareness of the sector in the country. In addition, the fact that some NGOs are not reporting their activities to government was shared through radio.

Several interviewees reported important gaps in participation, such as the 'health sector' or education or a particular ministry that fails to attend. Also, not all water agencies may be involved. Reasons suggested include rivalry between ministries (for example, in relation to responsibility for sanitation), simple oversight by those leading the review process or the working groups that are part of it, late invitations, or lack of delegation within the ministry invited.

The participation of the political leadership in the JSR process is cited as important but not always achieved. Some blame a lack of buy-in to implement priority actions on lack of participation by political leaders. The Ugandan process is noted for the participation of the ministers in key discussions, including the government retreat that precedes the JSR gathering, as well as the gathering itself. However, this is perhaps a reflection of good communication between technical staff and the political leadership throughout the year. A JSR cannot suddenly address all challenges.

Cooperation by lead donor

Cooperation by the lead donor (if there is one) was evidenced in the JSR documentation, including a signed statement for Uganda, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Burundi, and Tanzania. Just as important is the existence of

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[24] Including the investments made, how long it took to for the units to be fully established with sufficient skills and confidence to lead and government motivation for the mainstreaming of such units within ministry and staff structures.

donor coordination mechanisms. This was not examined in detail for all countries, but features in the recommendations set out in Chapter 6.

Frequency and regularity

Where JSRs are regular, most countries follow an annual cycle, with Nepal being a notable exception, having chosen to hold a JSR gathering every two years. Ethiopia has not been holding JSRs on a regular basis. Interim gatherings, with wide participation (usually referred to as a joint technical review) were held in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Rwanda,[25] and Uganda. There are pros and cons for the annual cycle. It can link in with government annual planning cycles but, often, more than a year is required for new priority actions to be funded and implemented. This means that priorities set at the JSR in one year may not have significantly advanced by the following year. Nepal has decided that the two-year cycle is more appropriate and reviews progress in all priority actions at the annual Sector Stakeholder Group meeting (Danert and Karki 2016).

Preparation activities

In most countries, preparation for the JSR gathering takes several weeks, or in the case of Uganda and Burundi, three and four months, respectively. Detailed written documentation of WASH JSR procedures has only been found for three countries (Liberia, Nepal, and Uganda). Interviews with stakeholders revealed differences in the review procedures followed (Box 7).

> *"For the second JSR [in Liberia] I realized that it is a process rather than an event".*
> **Study interviewee**

Although only two JSR cycles have taken place in Nepal (in 2011 and 2014), the report (MoUD 2014a) describes a systematic process with a considerable pre-event preparation. The exchange within and between the working groups and the learning visit teams in the build-up to the conference in Nepal is particularly striking. The detailed thematic input papers prepared for Burkina Faso in 2009 indicate a substantive pre-event review (or data collection) process prior to the actual gathering, but it is not clear if this continued for future cycles. In 2013, for example, the inputs appear to include a report from national programs (DRG–DGAEUE–ONEA [2013]) and several PowerPoint presentations. Seven input papers were prepared for the 2006 JSR in Yemen, suggesting a considerable pregathering process. Chapters of Uganda's sector performance report are written by the responsible departments, and there is a government-only retreat to discuss the draft report before it is finalized and circulated widely. In the case of Uganda, the preparation process has evolved over time. From the fourth review, the themes were covered, and indicators were clearly defined in a Sector Performance Measurement Framework (MWLE 2004).

In Rwanda and Uganda, the JSR process is part of the national planning and reporting cycle, but it is not clear whether this is the case for the other countries. In Nepal, the Department of Water Supply and Sewerage within the Ministry of Urban Development has a mandatory quarterly reporting process which feeds into an annual departmental review. This has not been explicitly linked to the country's JSRs (Danert and Karki 2016).

In contrast, the depth of involvement of in-country stakeholders in Sierra Leone's review process is questionable given that the lead author for the sector performance report was based outside the country (Box 7). This study has not been able to find out why this was the case, and indeed there may have been good reasons at the time. This example simply illustrates the need to reflect and take stock of JSR processes.

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[25] Rwanda holds a "forward-looking" and a "backward-looking" JSR every year.

In **Burundi**, preparations usually start four months prior to the JSR conference. They are led by a working group composed of the involved ministries, donors and NGOs. Data collection of financial resources to the sector start up to three months prior to the JSR, and inter-ministerial working groups review progress of sector strategy implementation.

In **Nepal** in 2014, the preparation process for the conference took six weeks and included a planning meeting, thematic group formation, brainstorming sessions and committee meetings, preparation of checklists, learning visits, and sharing meetings. The meetings were held to identify core issues, review policy, capture learning and compliance, and recommend actions. Working papers and presentations were prepared by each of the thematic and learning visit teams. They were discussed and revised at the sharing meetings, before being presented at the conference. There was considerable exchange within and between working groups and learning visit teams in the build-up to the conference. A total of 70 people participated in the planning meeting, 55 in the learning visits, and 80 in the learning visit sharing; there were 200 stakeholders at the conference. There was a duplication of roles between a resolutions committee and the thematic groups at the meeting, but this has proven to be a learning experience.

In **Liberia,** the first JSRs in 2013 brought many stakeholders together for the first time but, according to interviewees, discussions were limited. A Sector Performance Report (SPR) drew national data together as part of the 2014 JSR and was used as the basis for discussion at the gathering. There was more opportunity for discussion than in the previous year. Interviewees have commented that the SPR in 2015 was prepared in a rush and was not finalized prior to the meeting. The event report (Hall 2015) states that the lack of a timely report was the reason for no formal donor response to the report at the gathering.

In **Sierra Leone**, Sector Performance Reports were prepared for the WASH conferences in both 2013 and 2014. While the reports are thorough, on both occasions (pre-Ebola), the lead author was based outside the country and never visited it. This study has not been able to find out why this was the case, and indeed there may have been good reasons at the time. The 2013 report was officially published by the government. The 2014 report does not appear to have been finalized.

In **Yemen**, six working groups or review teams completed reviews for the 2006 Joint Annual Review (Republic of Yemen, 2006) for seven input papers: water resources management, rural water supply and sanitation, finance, irrigation and watershed, donor coordination, harmonization and alignment and action plan progress (Anon-Yemen 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, 2005f, no date).

In 2014 in **Zambia**, the review process included a review mission, which included visits to five (out of 10) provinces to assess and debate sector issues at all levels. The review drew on "comprehensive" reports from government departments and other key actors (Anon-Zambia 2014). However, Zambia lacks a comprehensive functional monitoring and evaluation system. An ongoing recommendation from the 2010, 2011, and 2014 reviews is to finalize a monitoring and evaluation framework, including key performance indicators and an overview of how data will be collected through different management systems and surveys.

Review against indicators and targets

Interviewees have also pointed out that it is difficult to report without any indicators, baseline or targets against which to measure. In several countries, the development and measurement of indicators, or key performance indicators, is an incremental process. In Burundi, 12 indicators were agreed in 2014 and published in the *Indicator Guide*, but not all of them can yet be measured due to lack of information within certain institutions (MEEATU 2014).

The Zambian 2014 *Aid Memoire* (Anon-Zambia 2014) points out the lack of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system for WASH and Water Resources, including a lack of key performance indicators. Notably, this gap was raised at the 2010 and 2011 reviews but had not yet been addressed. Although it published its Monitoring Framework in 2004, Uganda was not able to report on all of its golden indicators in the early years, and also added more over time (Ssozi and Danert 2012). A review of literature and interviews with stakeholders in Nepal highlighted that while considerable data are being collected, including utility benchmarking (MoUD, 2015a), there are still gaps in the data, and there is no overall monitoring framework for the sector as a whole that brings these coherently together to systematically report on performance.

Topics covered

There is considerable variation in the scope of 'WASH' JSRs. Some focus exclusively on WASH while others also cover one or more aspects of solid waste management, water resources, environment or water for agriculture (Appendix 6). Although there is a strong sense of WASH as a sector internationally, there is no one-size-fits-all solution that may be beneficial for a country to organize its development sectors in other ways.

The extent and way that finance is covered varies. Few countries provide an overview of the government financial allocations and expenditure for WASH, with Kenya,[26] Liberia, and Uganda among the notable exceptions. Uganda's Sector Performance Reports provide an overview of all WASH on-budget support (that is, finance that is channeled through government), estimates of NGO investment, and details such as WASH expenditure by district local governments and utility operating costs in relation to revenue (MWE 2015).

Liberia's 2013 Sector Performance Report (Government of Liberia 2014) consolidates information on government and donor WASH finance from published public financial management data and donor finance from the Ministry of Finance's Aid Management Unit (Figures 3 and 4). Pulling the donor data together revealed that UNICEF WASH funding for the previous financial year had not been submitted to the Ministry of Finance, or captured by them. The WASH JSR thus inadvertently provided a check mechanism for government and UNICEF. Fully referenced financial data is an area where there is scope for considerable improvement in many countries.

	WASH	Other Areas
2012/13	7.8	664
2013/14	2.5	580

WASH: 1.2% (2012/13); WASH: 0.4% (2013/14)

FIGURE 3: LIBERIA GOVERNMENT BUDGET FOR WASH: FISCAL YEARS 2012/13 AND 2013/14 (GOL, 2014)

	WASH	Other Areas
2012/13	12	607
2013/14	30	755
2014/15	18	613

WASH: 1.9% (2012/13); WASH: 3.8% (2013/14); WASH: 2.9% (2014/15)

FIGURE 4: DONOR AID FOR WASH: BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012/13 AND 2013/14, AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2014/15 (GOL, 2014)

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[26] Financial data for the country is presented but references are not given. It has been assumed that the data are official ministry data.

The Ethiopia and Liberia reviews focus on processes rather than on outputs or outcomes, whereas Uganda examines progress against defined indicators. The Kenya Water Sector report includes considerable information about progress of various projects. One of the areas that is lacking across the board is analysis of the quality of project implementation (including design, construction, and social mobilization). The JSRs also include relatively little information about the quality of water supply services or regulation. However, "sustainability checks" and "third party monitoring" have been undertaken for WASH programming, in some countries, independent government physical monitoring may be undertaken by other agencies, such as those responsible for planning. There is a need to explore existing and possible future connections between JSRs and such initiatives.[27]

Stakeholders have pointed out examples of important issues that are not being addressed sufficiently by the review process. The Tanzania JSR report focuses exclusively on the National Program, leaving out the efforts of others. Although it refers to the number of people that have benefitted from water points (MoW 2014a, p. 12), there is no information about the districts in which this work has been undertaken, nor how these figures contribute to the overall trends in the country. Although since 2008, the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network (TAWASANET) prepares an Equity Report which complements the JSR, the focus changes from year to year and so does not cover the gap. TAWASANET raised the profile of pollution through its contribution to the review (Box 8), a topic that was not otherwise addressed.

BOX 8: CONCERNS RAISED BY JSR PARTICIPANTS IN TANZANIA

At the 2014 Review in Tanzania, TAWASANET raised concerns about pollution cases that threaten drinking water: "*The Ngerengere River is 1000 times [more] polluted than the typical level for clean rivers and has faecal coliforms from sewage at up to 8000 times the safe level of drinking water set by WHO. The pollution endangers the health and livelihoods of downstream users, posing high health risks to thousands of people in Kingolwira, Kipera and Sangasanga Streets, who have no option than to use the polluted water for domestic and farming purposes because the area is characterized with high salinity of groundwater. The Ngerengere river water also enters the Ruvu River, the main source for drinking water for Dar es Salaam. Msimbazi River poses health risks of more than 200,000 people with a high pH … causing severe burns to skin, Chromium (6) levels [that pose] a threat of cancer and birth defects …we also understand that the river has potential recharge for local groundwater of which thousands of the residents depend* (MoW 2014a, p. 52–53).

Consolidation of data

Five countries were found to consolidate information into one report, such as a sector performance report, or sector status report prior to the JSR gathering, that is, Uganda, Liberia, Malawi, Kenya,[28] and Tanzania. In Kenya, the Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB) has published an annual subsector performance report since 2008. Draft consolidated reports have been collated for Sierra Leone and Zambia. However, they were not finalized before the gathering. It appears that the reports for the most recent JSRs in Sierra Leone (2014) and Zambia (2014) are still in draft form.

One of the biggest challenges across the board is to ensure that organizations report, so that key information can be analyzed, synthesized, and presented at the JSR. In the case of Rwanda, the incentives are simple: if

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[27] Sustainability checks have been undertaken for WASH in Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zambia.

[28] It has been assumed that Kenya's Annual Water Sector Report (MEWNR 2014) was finalized, although there are some gaps suggesting that this may not be the very final version. There is no mention of it being a draft report, but the acronyms are not completed.

the agencies responsible for WASH do not report to the Ministry of Finance, they do not receive funds.[29] Likewise in Uganda, district local government reporting on finance, achievements, and the indicators captured in the JSR process is directly linked to their funding (Ssozi and Danert 2012, Danert 2015b). In one country, the working group responsible for collecting data have spent weeks collecting data and (re)contacting stakeholders. Apparently, threatening those that did not report that they would not be included in the analysis and final JSR report sometimes helped.

However, in cases where there are no financial inducements, more creative incentives for reporting may need to be sought, such as embarrassing the organizations or paying for the reporting. In Liberia, the WASH Media Network facilitated journalists to attend the JSR gathering in 2015. The network picked up stories of NGOs not reporting and ran them in the media. At a global level, there is need to develop a culture of in-country reporting by WASH actors which is linked to the country requirements and standards.

An analysis of the JSR reports and proceedings shows considerable variation of information and how it is used. Referencing or explanation of the origin of data is often weak. In most countries, there is scope for improvement, including better use of existing in-country information. Examples are given below, and detailed in Appendix 7. Readers from the respective countries are requested to take these comments as constructive critique:

- The JSR reports (or proceedings) for Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Nepal do not provide a succinct overview of national trends (despite the existence of national surveys).
- The Sector Performance Report (Figure 9) is central to the Ugandan JSR. It is a very comprehensive report that pulls in data from national surveys as well as the main government agencies and NGOs working on WASH, water resources, and environmental management. However, collating and updating all of this data on an annual basis places a tremendous load on the government and partners.

PHOTO CREDIT: MARTIN LAENG.

Sector Performance Reports for WASH in Uganda have been prepared annually for the JSR gathering since 2004.

- Considerable data is set out in the Yemen input reports, but with no references. None of the reports are authored. The finance report seems to have been written by the KfW (judging by a date and signature at the end of the report). The way that the rural report refers the General Authority for Rural Water and Sanitation Projects (GARPWSP) suggests that it has been written by someone from outside the authority, for example, *"GARPWSP… have to seriously consider improving sanitation and hygiene promotion….this has to be reflected in budgets… the following inadequacies have been observed"*. This raises the question of how GARPWSP was involved in the review.
- The Zimbabwe 2011 report does not include any references to the source of government figures for water and sanitation access, number of boreholes drilled or pollution of the country's rivers.

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[29] Information from interviewee.

Expenditure of US$3.6 million by the treasury is included (without reference), but there is no explanation of how it was invested. Investments through the WASH cluster of US$29.3 million are stated but without reference to any other reports.

Pulling information together into a consolidated Sector Performance Report or Sector Status report is a highly skilled and time consuming endeavor. Unless there are institutional or financial inducements or it becomes part of the sector culture (which would be ideal), incentives for consolidating information are lacking. There are logistical challenges, and the writing, referencing and presentation skills of WASH government and NGO staff are often low. As noted in Chapter 2, in the context of fragility and protracted crisis, staff turnover is often high, which means that new people may require training, support or mentoring. Capacity for in-country peer review to improve document quality may also be limited. One interviewee argued that writing and quality-assuring the Liberian Sector Performance Report will need at least another five years of support, especially with people switching jobs. However, Uganda's case in particular illustrates that all of these can be improved over time. Practice, learning by doing, the right incentives, support and mentoring can all help to build in-country analytical and presentation capacity. And even if staff members move on, they will take the learned skills with them.

Lack of reliable electricity and internet facilities (to send in reports) is a major practical obstacle to actually pulling a good report together. Taking time out of other work (and family) demands and finding the place and peace of mind to concentrate on writing are major constraints, particularly for government staff, but also for other agencies where expectations of staff are already pushing the limit. In some cases, actually finishing reports seems to a problem with an example of the previous year's sector performance report only being finalized for the JSR in the following year, while another postgathering report took eight months before it was published.

Despite these challenges, consolidated data, particularly if presented in an accessible way, can be very powerful. The 2013 report for Burundi (MEEATU 2014), for example, includes a map illustrating who is working in which province for water and sanitation (Figure 5). Such information helps stakeholders to take stock of who is working where. However, the report does not include information on what implementation or support activities are run by these organizations. There is scope for improvement.

Financial contributions are collated by the NGO network (UWASNET) in

FIGURE 5: MAP SHOWING WHO IS INTERVENING IN WHICH PROVINCE IN BURUNDI (MEEATU, 2014)

Uganda, whereas in Liberia they are supposed to be submitted individually to the Ministry of Public Works but not all report (Anon-Liberia 2015). In Kenya, the NGO network KEWASNET produced the first Annual *CSO WASH and WRM Sector Performance Report for 2013/2014,* which captures CSO sector contributions (KEWASNET 2014).

Field monitoring visits

Evidence of field visits as part of the review processes was found for in five countries (in Nepal, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). Notably, they were not undertaken during the JSR gathering but rather in the build-up to it, such as within a joint review mission (Zambia and Tanzania), learning visits (Nepal) or as part of the mid-year joint technical review gathering (Uganda).

Field visits are considered an important part of a sector review and enable stakeholders, especially the development partners and those stakeholders outside the lead WASH sector ministry, to assess and verify progress. They enable issues found in the field to be brought to the attention of other stakeholders before, and at, the JSR gathering and can also influence the discussion on past and future JSR priorities.

Liberian interviewees felt that in preparing pre-JSR reports, government staff members need to have the opportunity to get out into the field and verify what is actually being done. However, this statement also reflects a lack of other opportunities for field verification. The Nepal study (Danert and Karki 2016) found that field visits were considered extremely important, that is, we were able to get known to others through the learning visits (FEDWASUN interviewee); *"the field visits enabled us to interact with each other"*. While this may sound obvious, in countries where the sector is highly fragmented, or where there is lack of familiarity and lack of trust, this is, in fact, extremely important and builds essential relationships for future collaboration, such as a joint development plan for the sector, a monitoring framework, or social innovation and joint problem solving.

> **"Agreeing on a common action plan is not a joke!"**
> *NGO interviewee, Nepal*

JSR gathering

When discussing JSR processes, there has been a tendency to focus on the JSR gathering, whether it is called a meeting, conference, forum or workshop, or simply referred to as "the JSR". In most countries, the JSR gathering took two to three days. Rwanda, with a half-day gathering, is unusual, but there are a series of smaller meetings that feed into this. Most of the JSR gatherings were attended by between 100 and 300 participants from national government agencies, local governments, NGOs/civil society, donors and UN agencies and, to a lesser extent, the private sector.

Gatherings tend to take place in the capital city, although there are examples of holding it in other parts of the country, notably South Sudan and Liberia, as well as the Joint Technical Reviews in Uganda. In the Liberia case, interviewees noted that holding the 2015 event in Gbarnga, Bong County, instead of in the capital Monrovia, helped to focus the event on rural WASH, where there is lots of activity and demand but a lack of systematic reporting.

JSR gatherings tend to be structured with plenary and also some parallel sessions. One interviewee expressed frustration at the tendency of the JSR gathering to place too much emphasis on what agencies have done: *"the JSR gathering should be a platform to meet and talk more about the issues with others. Solutions for these should be sought at the highest level".* An example such an issue is the lack of latrines in poor communities. The underlying causes, such as lack of access to sufficient land, could be brought to the

JSR table, helping government to find solutions and make appropriate decisions. Another illustrative example is the gaps in utility benchmarking data in Nepal, with inflow data to the piped water supplies often lacking. Further enquiry or a study as part of the JSR process could help to understand why, and bring this information to the attention of others to solve. Maybe it is difficult to procure bulk water meters of good quality, so how can this be addressed?

Pre-JSR documents with reliable evidence are also considered very important to inform debate. By consolidating and presenting key data, they can help to move the discussion from "*this is what we did*" to more in-depth enquiry and discussion.

Field visits as part of gathering

While none of the countries included field visits in the JSR gathering, these are often included within the wider review process (discussed above).

Setting priority actions and reporting on achievements

The large number of recommendations from the JSR process (in the pre- or postmeeting reports) is a reflection of the enormity of need. Between five and 40 recommendations are made for each country (Table 5 and Box 9), although they can accumulate to almost 100. In some countries, the most recent reviews did not go beyond recommendations, whereas in others, undertakings, resolutions, a declaration or binding commitments for action were set (Table 7). In some, a declaration was signed by representatives, in the case of Nepal, from four government ministries, the development partner group and the water users' federation, FEDWASUN.

Signing a document in itself does not automatically lead to action, as noted in Chapter 4. The fact that this is not straightforward for most countries tends to be equated with either:

- the incentives, ability and willingness of institutions to address the priorities set; or
- the ability and willingness of others to hold those responsible to account for achievement.

However, there may be fundamental flaws in how the priorities were set in the first place, or with the priority actions themselves. In Kenya, it has been recognized that there is a need to *"restructure the approach used to identify and plan the sector undertakings"* (MEWNR 2014).

The study authors are concerned that sometimes priorities may be set too quickly, and that influential organizations, as well as strong characters, may push their own agenda to the detriment of the decision-making process. Many organizations now have policy influencing outcomes in their own logframes or results framework, and getting these into the priority actions of a JSR may serve their purpose while not being totally appropriate or fully agreed.

Setting priority actions that are SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound), specifying which organization—and even individual—will take the lead and have the buy-in, or at least consensus of all implicated, is not something that can be done in a rush. Setting priorities is not just a technical activity, but a social and political endeavor.[30] Uganda has dealt with problems faced in setting

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[30] Each stakeholder has substantive interests related to the outcome or result. The parties will also have psychological or emotional interests that are related to the thoughts and feelings they have throughout the process. Being "satisfied" by a group decision actually means that you are comfortable that a combination of substantive, procedural, and psychological needs have been met. Substantive refers to content needs such as money, time, goods or resources. Procedural interests are needs for specific types of behavior or the "way that something is done". The psychological, or relationship, interests refer to how one feels, how one is treated or the conditions for an ongoing relationship. If there is too much emphasis on, say, substantive needs, and not enough on the

priorities by adapting, agreeing on them, and signing in a smaller group (sector working group) one week after the JSR gathering.

Priorities need to take into account the wider context, as well as trying to influence it. Finance cannot be taken for granted but if there is flexibility, particularly among partners, and sufficient time to draw on government resources, there is evidence of financial constraints being overcome. Nepal's example of UNICEF financing the consultant to lead the development of a sector development plan and the World Bank taking on the sector financing strategy are examples of donor flexibility, as well as of playing to their respective strengths (Danert and Karki 2015).

Practically all countries covered by this study deserve in-depth analysis of the priority setting process itself to find ways that it can be improved. Not all countries systematically document achievements of the priority actions set in the previous year.

BOX 9: EXAMPLES OF PRIORITIES SET AT JSRS

In **Malawi**, undertakings recommended at the December 2013 workshop were adopted by the sector working group in May 2014 (Anon-Malawi, no date). The 2014 JSR Workshop in December 2014 tried to report on status but noted that the 2014 undertakings were passed after the 2014 budget had been passed and were thus not provided for. The 2014 workshop also reviewed the status of the 2012 and 2013 undertakings, which included "fast track sector devolution", a "capacity building strategy", a "funding mechanism for SWAp"—all not achieved—and "increase urban coverage by 5-10 percent", "reduce nonrevenue water in urban areas and market centres by at least 5 percent", of which some aspects are reported as achieved. Since 2011, stakeholders in Malawi have set about 40 undertakings, which were reported on, or set over 33 pages in the 2014 JSR workshop report.

The 2012 meeting in **South Sudan** concludes with the following recommendations:

i. Allocating more funds for implementation directly by the states.
ii. Expediting the development of water supply schemes in state capitals.
iii. Developing a clear policy on the appropriate water scheme types for use at different levels.
iv. Increasing coordination between the central and state ministers responsible for WASH.

The undertakings set at the 2013 Joint Water Sector Review in **Tanzania** were grouped into Water Resources Management, Rural Water Supply and Sanitation, Urban Water Supply and Sanitation, Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building. These four groups reflect the four components of Tanzania's National Project. At the 2014 review, it was reported that seven out of 11 were implemented, three were partially implemented and one was not done (MoW 2014a). Notably, all 11 undertakings were phrased in the form of activities, rather than outputs or outcomes, for example, Undertaking 7: "*Encourage USWAs to access loans from financial institutions*"; Status: "*Several meetings and workshops were conducted to encourage UWSA's to access loans from financial institutions*" (MoW 2014b).

JSR gathering report

All countries studied produced some form of gathering report, such as the form of a declaration, aide-mémoire, outcome statement or resolution. Not all countries appear to have prepared a report of the proceedings of the actual gathering; where these exist, they do not always include an attendance list. Yemen is one of the few countries that have published the results of the participants' questionnaire (MWE 2007).

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procedural aspect, people may walk away from the decision dissatisfied, and not committed to its implementation (adapted from UNITAR, 2015).

5.5   Champions, Incentives, and Management

WASH JSRs have not just emerged from countries, and have not simply improved mechanically by themselves. They have been driven by individuals and organizations. Table 7 provides an overview of the origins and support for early JSRs for some countries.[31] Exchange visits to see JSRs working in another country have been a popular way of trying to trigger the process. Stakeholders from at least eight countries have attended Uganda's JSR gathering over its 15-year history and Ugandan JSR expertize catalyzed Liberia's Sector Performance Report.[32]

TABLE 7: ORIGINS AND SUPPORT OF EARLY JSRS (OR EQUIVALENT) IN SELECT COUNTRIES

Country	Origins and Support
Ethiopia	WaSH JSR process in 2006 was conceived through the Country Dialogue on WASH (launched in November 2005). It was set up to move the sector to a programmatic approach. IRC and Finland have provided technical support for the Multi-Stakeholder Forum (Girma and Suominen 2013).
Liberia	The first Joint Sector Review (2013) was conceived in the WASH compact (Republic of Liberia 2011).
Malawi	Delta Partnership developed Sector Performance Report in 2010 (for UNICEF and Ministry Irrigation and Water Development) (Delta Partnership, no date).
Nepal	The first JSR was driven by UNICEF, but the JSR process is now an integral part of the country's Development Cooperation Policy (Government of Nepal 2014).
Sierra Leone	JSR was introduced by the DFID WASH facility (personal communication with WASH facility staff).
Tanzania	The first Joint Water Sector Review established the basis of a joint government and development partner's process for future performance monitoring and priority setting (GoURT 2006). It is part of the National Water Sector Development Strategy (2006-2015) and the Joint Assistance Strategy.
Uganda	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) funding in the late 1990s gave government a tremendous funding boost for water and sanitation. It became clear to donors that their smaller projects could not operate alongside government without a common approach. This led to the formation of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWA) and JSR (Mechta 2015). Development of the Sector Performance Measurement Framework was funded by DFID over three years.
Yemen	Joint Annual Reviews in 2006 and 2007 were supported by the Netherlands Government.
Zimbabwe	Joint Sector Review 2011 was supported financially by UNICEF and the WSP.

Individual champions are definitely essential, particularly in the early years of establishing the review process, when ideas of how it could work tend to be unclear. For Liberia, Nepal and Uganda, government staff members, technical advisors within government ministries and/or consultants paid for by the DFID, ADB, UNICEF and WSP were instrumental in driving and sustaining the momentum of JSRs, particularly in the first one to five years. Incentives for involvement in a JSR are unlikely to be apparent to all stakeholders at the start. WASH professionals interviewed in Liberia have explained how their own interest, as well as that of others, has grown over the three JSR cycles. Reliable, long-term donor partners with flexibility to strengthen institutions and build skills through "learning by doing", training, and mentoring is key, also for the JSR.

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[31] The study was not able to explicitly find out the initial driving forces for most JSRs. Theoretically, the entry points for the processes include: acknowledgment of government for the need to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate progress in realizing the right to water and sanitation; committed, long-term donor working with a government which in turn has a commitment to a national monitoring process; high proportion of finance in the sector is controlled by government and donors want to link into this, desire by stakeholders to coordinate with others and build on synergies; WASH cluster in transition; large UN-funded program with government and willingness to work with other agencies which are not funded through the program.

[32] Countries attending Uganda's JSR include Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nepal, and Zambia. Eng. Disan Ssozi, Ministry of Water and Environment, Uganda participated in Liberia's first Joint Sector Review in 2012 and advised stakeholders that a Sector Performance Report was needed.

6 Recommendations for Joint Sector Review Effectiveness

6.1 Defining a Joint Sector Review

This study defines a JSR as *a periodic process that brings different stakeholders in a particular sector together to engage in dialogue, review status, progress and performance, and take decisions on priority actions.*

As part of the review process, information or evidence in the form of data, studies, reports, field visits and/or independent reviews is consolidated and analyzed. The process includes various formal and informal procedures of stakeholder engagement that lead up to a biennial, annual or half-yearly gathering. The process is led by a sector ministry or ministries and has the participation of a wide range of stakeholders. JSR processes can be undertaken at district, state or national level, depending on need and in-country governance set-up. Figure 6 illustrates the pre- and postgathering activities, as well as the gathering itself. The words in **underlined bold** in the text below are particularly important:

- A JSR is a **process** rather than a one-off event.
- Status, progress, and performance is **reviewed** using evidence-based **information**.
- Different **technical and political stakeholders** come together.
- There is considerable **dialogue** and **discussion** (including disagreement).
- A **gathering**, forum, meeting or conference takes place.
- The process is **government-led**.
- **Priority actions** are agreed.
- Priority actions **feed into** the national context, including reforms and service delivery (Figure 6).
- The JSR process, including priority actions, is **documented**.

FIGURE 6: JSR PROCESS AND ITS VITAL LINK TO THE NATIONAL CONTEXT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

To become effective, a JSR process should not be one-off but rather a cycle. The cycle can happen every two years, annually, or every six months, but should be regular. JSRs should be timed to align with government reporting and budgeting calendars.

Ideally, the JSR process improves from one cycle to the next, drawing in new stakeholders and enhanced information with improved dialogue and review mechanisms and better setting of priority actions. In order to impact on sector policies, institutions, program implementation, and funding, the JSR process should become an integral part of government, donor, NGO and CSO planning, monitoring and reporting, and of sector culture. However, this usually takes years to achieve.

6.2 Elements of a Joint Sector Review

This study has identified about 60 different elements of a WASH JSR process. This can be overwhelming for those starting out or those wanting to improve their processes. However, the different elements are grouped and set out graphically to provide stakeholders with a way of visualizing their own JSR process. Figure 7 provides the overview. This is subsequently broken down into more details in Figures 8 to 12. Combined with Figure 6, these diagrams provide a series of visual checklists to enable stakeholders to reflect on and review existing JSRs and for consideration by those who are embarking on the journey.

FIGURE 7: OVERVIEW OF A JOINT SECTOR REVIEW (JSR) PROCESS, WITHIN THE WIDER CONTEXT

The JSR process is illustrated by a circle, with various elements inside shown as a honeycomb. The wider context is illustrated by the elements (small circles) outside the big circle. As mentioned already, if the JSR is to have impact, there needs to be a connection between the JSR process and the messy wider context, including finance, reforms, and service delivery. If this does not happen, the JSR remains a "discussion island". This is valuable in its own right, but it is the interaction between the JSR and the wider context that can help to catalyze change. "JSR thinking" cannot afford to end once the gathering is over.

There is considerable diversity of WASH JSRs and there is no JSR blueprint. Some elements are common, particularly the gathering that brings stakeholders together. However, every country process is different.

This is due to, for example, the particularities of a country's fragility or crises, the number and type of agencies in the sector, the ways that government agencies do (or do not) operate, finance ministry support to WASH, skilled and motivated individuals in the sector, the behavior and attitudes of donor organizations and the longevity (or short horizons) and type of support that they offer. Starting points differ tremendously. Each country is at a different stage, JSRs are dynamic, and so the relative importance of the elements set out below changes over time.

The numerous elements of a JSR can be grouped into three broad categories (Figure 7):
1. How the WASH sector works—that is, its laws, policies and institutions.
2. The subsectors reviewed—that is: does the scope cover water resources, or environmental management as well as WASH?
3. How the JSR is organized—comprising the JSR activities and processes; logistics, skills and resources, and the JSR documentation.

A sector monitoring and evaluation framework defines what is monitored and evaluated, including what is reported, how, when, and responsibilities. It also sets out the way in which findings are discussed, communicated, and linked to action. A monitoring and evaluation framework is shown in the center of Figure 7 to reflect its centrality to the JSR process. If such a framework exists, it should reflect the aims of the JSR, how it is organized, and how it relates to the wider WASH sector. Although such a framework is important, JSR processes can commence before the framework has been defined. Ideally, it should be completed and become operational within a few years of the first JSR, even if it focuses on only a few specific indicators. Otherwise, the JSR may lose focus and not benefit from data and evidence.

Figure 7 shows key aspects of the wider context (outside the big circle). These are not part of a JSR but will influence how the JSR works can be affected by decisions taken through the JSR. As noted above, it is very important to consider the wider context and link the JSR to it.

How the sector works

(A) Institutions

The JSR may examine institutional themes (elements inside the yellow honeycomb) such as:
1. The human right to water and sanitation.
2. Legal and policy framework.
3. Finance, that is, budget released and expenditure.
4. Coordination, harmonization, and alignment.
5. Staffing and human resources.
6. Gender, disabled accessibility and marginalized groups.

The wider context of laws and policies including how planning, funding and reporting modalities and cycles are planned are very important. These are the rules of game play which determine what can and cannot be taken forward from the JSR, for example:
1. A Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp), or agreement such as a "compact" may have triggered the JSR process.
2. A JSR may be a mandatory part of a Joint Assistance Strategy.
3. Local governments be required to report on their WASH finance and activities to the sector ministry or another agency.
4. The JSR process should be aligned with the government reporting, planning, and budgeting cycle. In this way, reports can be drawn in, and priority actions that require funding could be taken up within

the government budget. All relevant agencies must be properly involved in decision making within JSR process.

5. Binding commitments cannot simply go against the laws or the constitution of the country unless they become part of a political process.

FIGURE 8: ELEMENTS OF HOW THE SECTOR WORKS

Subsectors reviewed or scope of themes covered

Defining the thematic scope of a JSR is crucial. WASH itself has many different topics including household to institutional services. The JSR may also cover water resources, as well as water for productive purposes (for instance, irrigation, livestock, industry, energy) and ecosystems. Figure 9 shows the 20 main themes that could be covered within WASH and Water Resources JSRs. As noted, not all countries cover all of these themes, and each country needs to select what is in accordance with the sector scope. This may also change over time.


FIGURE 9: SCOPE OF THEMES OR SUBSECTORS REVIEWED THROUGH THE JSR

With so many potential themes or subsectors that can be reviewed, a decision should be taken on whether all should be covered in every JSR cycle or if the emphasis can be rotated. Rotating enables discussion and analysis to go deeper in one particular year. Good indicators and targets for each theme can clarify what is being reviewed, and provide an indication of progress (or lack thereof). Indicators and targets are a component of the sector monitoring and evaluation framework, which is discussed below. However, not everything can be expressed numerically. There are nuances to the indicators, and so the qualitative reporting and discussion is essential, too.

The wider context of information, stakeholder and activities (including project and program implementation, utility management, and self-supply) is very important. This is illustrated by the three rows of key aspects shown outside the JSR circle in Figure 9. Data and information from water supply inventories, mapping, national surveys and census, hydrometric databases, groundwater databases as well as project and program reports can be drawn on, providing an evidence base for the JSR discussions and to set priority actions. Problems arise if these sources are not trusted, considered out of date or conveniently ignored.

Representatives from all relevant agencies and stakeholder groups should participate in the review process. These include national and local government agencies, political leaders, donor agencies, international as well as national NGOs, CSOs, the private sector, academic institutions, and the media. An appropriate representative of the finance ministry must be involved. Both humanitarian and development agencies should participate to encourage collaboration and joint learning and overcome the artificial barriers between these communities.

(B) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

The scope of WASH JSRs varies. Urban and rural water supply and sanitation is ubiquitous but the scope of the sector depends on government departmental mandates and on donor priorities. Solid waste management, for example, is a topic that may or may not be included. Once the scope has been defined, JSRs should try not to leave out any relevant projects, stakeholders or subsectors associated with it. In countries with a national WASH program, the program itself can dominate the JSR, leaving out important activities, priorities, and observations of others. There is need for comprehensive picture and dialogue. The 10 themes or subsectors in Figure 9, listed here, provide one way of dividing up the WASH sector:

1. WASH-related impacts (for instance, infant or child mortality, cholera deaths, school attendance).
2. Urban water supply and regulation.
3. Rural water supply and regulation.
4. Urban sanitation and regulation.
5. Rural sanitation and regulation.
6. Hygiene.
7. Solid waste management and regulation.
8. Wastewater, sewerage and regulation.
9. WASH in health centers.
10. WASH in schools.

(C) Water resources and Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)

WASH is a part of water and environment more generally. The extent to which other aspects are considered depends on how water is governed and organized within the country. There may be an official policy or management structure for Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). Or for example, the lead ministry may include domestic water supply and irrigation. Themes can include:

1. Water resources (surface and groundwater) regulation.
2. Water for production (agriculture, aquaculture).
3. Drainage and flood control.
4. Water quality and pollution control.
5. Climate change and disaster risk reduction.
6. Climate, hydrometric, and groundwater monitoring.
7. Water for industry and energy.
8. Water for nature.
9. Ecosystem services.
10. Drought management.

Other aspects of water may be brought into the JSR at the request of nonstate actors, such as donors funding specific activities (for instance, climate change or biodiversity protection). CSOs may also try to bring new topics to the JSR discussion (for example, pollution of water resources). There are no straightforward answers as to what should be included or left out. The main point is that that they are likely to change over time, particularly as awareness of an issue changes, government restructures or new sectors are defined.

How the JSR is organized

Many elements are needed to make a JSR successful, including clear processes, logistics, documentation and dissemination, as shown in Figure 10 and discussed here. Usually, several small thematic groups (which may be in line with government departments) are involved in the preparations for the JSR gathering, including consolidating and discussing information. These teams may also have responsibility to follow-up on priority actions. In contrast, a wider group of participants (100 to 300) attend the JSR gathering.

(D) JSR documentation

An effective JSR requires high-quality, properly referenced documentation that is easily available to all citizens in the country as well as the global WASH community.

Hard (published/printed) copies of publications to be discussed at the JSR gathering need to be made available to participants before the event itself. This enables stakeholders to internalize the information and be properly informed in discussions. Ideally, soft (electronic) copies should be circulated before the gathering.

A sector performance report (SPR) or sector status report is an ideal way of synthesizing data and information into one document prior to the JSR gathering. The process can be very useful and rewarding for those involved. However, its preparation is resource-intensive, and a good report takes several months to write, quality-assure, and edit. If no comprehensive report is prepared, there should at least be a set of pre-event papers or presentation as a basis for discussion. Adequate human resources (including time) and considerable skills are required to collect, analyze and synthesize data and communicate it, as well as determine what it means for policy, investment, and finance. This point is reiterated below, as part of the section on 'Logistics, skills and resources'. All pregathering documentation should be placed in the public domain.

A report of the JSR gathering is also required. It can be a stand-alone document which should include the JSR priority actions and a list of attendees to show who was (and was not) present. The list can highlight ministries or organizations with related interests but who are missing from discussions. Relevant documents such as pre-event papers, a comprehensive sector report, or strategies and plans need to be properly referenced. All documents should be publically available online.

FIGURE 10: HOW THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW IS ORGANIZED—DOCUMENTATION

Priority actions in the form of recommendations, targets, commitments or undertakings must be properly documented and made available, especially those with responsibility for taking them forwards. Documentation of the actual JSR process is important (and can be short). This boosts institutional memory (a particular problem when there is high staff turnover) and provides key information for reviewing and improving the JSR process over time.

Newspaper inserts, posters (for example, in government and NGO offices) and radio programs are ideal ways to inform the public about the JSR process and status of WASH in the country.

Websites are the most straightforward way to share reports widely. Placing JSR documentation into the public domain is essential for transparency and accountability at national level. High-quality, reliable WASH documentation is also in the interest of the global WASH community. Clearly, presenting progress and challenges based on reliable national data will make WASH more of an attractive investment nationally and globally.

(E) Logistics, skills and resources

The quality of a JSR process is strongly affected by the human resources, skills and funding available, as well as by timing. Good leadership by government requires dedicated staff and, ideally, those tasked with the responsibility for the JSR should also be tasked with wider coordination and planning roles. Leading the JSR process, and continuing to follow up on priority actions, as well as reaching out to new initiatives, other government and nonstate actors is more than one full-time job. Without adequate staff in place, or when those responsible are burdened with too many other tasks, fingers of blame can easily be pointed at governments for not properly fulfilling their leadership and coordination role. In many countries, this is where international organizations play an active role, such as by supporting government through technical advisory support and, in extreme cases, even staff members.

FIGURE 11: HOW THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW IS ORGANIZED—LOGISTICS, SKILLS, AND RESOURCES

However, too much reliance on external support risks undermining government leadership and can create dependency; too little, and the process may never get off the ground, or reach a desired level of quality. Each context and time has its own balance. In fragile states or those in protracted crisis, as well as in countries with high staff turnover, government capacity may need to be strengthened over and over again. This requires considerable donor flexibility. Donors can trigger and support JSR processes by providing finance for key aspects as well as technical support.

As well as the management and logistics skills for organizing the JSR process and a major stakeholder event, some participants of the JSR gathering may also need financial support to attend. Staff time, transport and communications are required for the activities before and after the JSR gathering, as well as the gathering itself (Figure 11). Funding for this is essential, and needs to be handled transparently to reduce the risk of misused funds. In some contexts, travel and online communications can be difficult. Considerable time and effort is required to involve stakeholders who may not always be online, particularly those beyond the capital city.

Skills and behaviors of participants are also important. Good reports deserve a good, clear oral presentation. Presenters also need to be comfortable taking questions at a gathering without feeling personally attacked or insulted. These can both be tackled through training and running a closed rehearsal in a safe environment, before standing in front of several hundred people.

(F) JSR activities and processes

The JSR process needs to be well defined and clearly communicated to all the stakeholders involved, so that they are clear about what is expected of them, when and how. The JSR gathering and finalization of priority actions should be aligned with the government reporting, planning, and budgeting cycle. In this way, reports can be drawn in, and priority actions that require funding could be taken up within the government budget. Priority actions that require funding will need to span two or more years.

Trust in the process is critical. Open, clear communication and mutual accountability is part of this, particularly on the costs and funding for the process and events. While corruption is not limited to fragile states, or those in protracted crisis, levels of interpersonal trust can often be lower and this frequently leads to delays and unnecessary barriers to implementation, including the implementation of priority actions set at the JSR.

Although involvement of humanitarian agencies in JSRs is vital, an observation is that WASH cluster agencies are often absent from JSR processes. Humanitarian agencies need to be invited to join the process. This may require encouragement and support from the WASH cluster lead. Involvement should be reported, along with other attendance in the JSR report.

Agreeing to priority actions that can be taken forward is one of the most difficult parts of the entire JSR process. Alas, in amongst the excitement of field visits, preparation of reports, logistics and presentations, this often gets left to the last minute and does not receive the attention that it deserves. There is need for a thorough process to set SMART, ambitious but realistic priority actions for the sector. The discussion itself needs to ensure that those who matter in taking the actions forward are actually present and can genuinely contribute to the discussion.

Financing of JSR priority actions may need to be incorporated in the government, donor or NGO budgets. Priority areas agreed at the JSR often target government, where weak capacity can undermine implementation. There is a need to balance tactical 'quick win' priorities with those that are longer term or

more strategic to build up confidence on all sides. Actions can also be set for others, such as donors, or NGOs.

Finally, returning to the advice given out at the start of the Section: if the JSR is to have impact, there needs to be a connection between the JSR process, the wider context (for instance, finance and reforms) and what actually takes place on the ground. The latter includes service delivery and user payments as well as water supply functionality and upkeep of sanitation facilities. Thus, if, for example, there are high levels of pollution, poor quality construction, weak community management or concerns about the way that Open Defecation Free (ODF) campaigns are being run, these should feed into the JSR process. In turn, the JSR process may take a decision to investigate further (for instance, through monitoring, a study or evaluation), or decide on a particular action (such as, enhance regulation enforcement). Unexpected opportunities also need to be harnessed to take forward decisions taken at the JSR.

FIGURE 12: HOW THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW IS ORGANISED—ACTIVITIES AND PROCESSES

Thus, "JSR thinking" does not end once the gathering and report writing is over. It continues with regular follow-up meetings of smaller teams, such as a thematic working group or a dedicated task force. In this way, funding can be sought; progress and challenges can be monitored and support given where needed. As a sector, if funding is available, it may be possible to hold a smaller half-yearly gathering where all those responsible for the priority actions report on progress.

7   Ways Forward

JSR processes can bring WASH stakeholders closer. Government can use them as part of a wider mechanism of dealing with multiple donors and NGOs with their various contributions and ideas for implementation, national institutions, and policy. An inclusive and participatory JSR process can provide voice to many stakeholders. JSRs can also help to find ways to systematically tap available human and financial resources. This is particularly important in fragile states and countries in protracted crisis, but also applies to other contexts where there is a proliferation of nonstate actors funding or implementing WASH.

JSRs can enable progress and highlight challenges the country is facing in fulfilling the SDGs as well as other performance indicators to be examined. They are a very useful mechanism for joint learning and sharing innovative practices. JSRs can enable many issues to be drawn out, which can subsequently feed into a national strategy or plan. JSR processes are social and political, as well as technical, and the decisions taken through a JSR process are not free of politics.

To meet the Sustainable Development Goals, Joint Sector Review processes need to impact on service delivery.[33]

PHOTO CREDIT: KERSTIN DANERT.

The weeks of reflection, discussion, and consolidation of data before the JSR gathering itself are very valuable for those who participate.

A JSR is a process rather than an event.

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[33] S. Oloyede, Chief of Idiomo Village, Egbeda, Oyo State, Nigeria, and the tap that provides free water … when it runs! At the time of our visit (June 2014), it had not done so for three days. It goes on and off, randomly. No pattern, no warning. The villagers try to store as much water as possible when the water runs. Once their water stock runs out, people travel far to fetch water; some use their car, others are on foot. The village tap is supplied from the Ashejire dam, which also serves parts of Ibadan city. When the electricity goes off, the plant shuts down. Once power is back, it takes several hours to get water to reach Ibadan (and the Idiomo Village tap) again.

JSRs, if done well, require considerable human resources. Those defining the JSR process need to be sure that they are not dominated by discussion on policies, coordination, and innovation but that they focus attention on rigorous monitoring and evaluation of implementation and service delivery on the ground.

JSRs could become a platform for mutual accountability between WASH stakeholders and provide accountability to citizens. However, this requires good reporting by all, popular versions for the public, and ensuring that these documents are accessible. This seems to be rather difficult to achieve and so requires considerable effort. Improving the status quo or reporting requires an understanding of existing mechanisms and incentives to improve them.

There is no readymade JSR that can simply be introduced. Each country or state (in the case of a federal system), has to go through its own process of learning and adaptation. Improvements may not be linear. Programming, reporting, and review processes need to be flexible enough to adapt to major changes in local circumstances, particularly in fragile states and countries suffering from protracted crisis.

> *You cannot introduce ready-made solutions into developing countries and simply bypass the process.*
> *(Andrews 2012)*

JSRs cannot be used by donors and NGOs to force governments to take certain actions, or vice versa. Nor are they a substitute for regulation. They are part of a monitoring and evaluation system, but not a replacement.

Decisions are often taken as part of the JSR process. Fulfilling priority actions set can be very difficult. There are a number of reasons for this, including: the agreements on what to do next taken at the JSR may not have been as consensual as it seemed; they may be vague or very broad; it may not be clear who takes them forward; there may be so many 'priorities'" that they are no longer priorities but a wish list; they may require funding, which does not materialize or takes time to secure; or working groups tasked with their fulfilment never met. JSRs can set priorities, but it is only the institutions in the country that can enable them to be fulfilled.

So what next? What are the ways forward? As the authors of this report, we see a very important role for JSRs, particularly in fragile states and countries suffering from protracted crisis. If there is interest in embarking on the JSR journey, or improving what is already being done, we encourage governments, donors, NGOs, CSOs, water users, the private sector, academia, and the media, as well as the growing international WASH community, to consider the following:

The JSR process

1. **JSR leadership:** It is only you, the government who can lead the JSR process—it is an issue of national sovereignty. We encourage you to take the lead and ask for support. Don't let others lead on your behalf. Consider vesting leadership in the main ministry with a responsibility for WASH. This could be, for example, a water, health or infrastructure ministry, depending on the institutional setup. It can be difficult to agree on leadership if there are overlapping and conflicting mandates. One way to deal with this is to second staff from one ministry to another, try to co-lead, or to have the decision taken by a higher authority.

   Decide on an appropriate scope for the JSR that fits your context and institutional set-up. Try to keep it simple. Set your own objectives as appropriate, and revisit them for every JSR cycle. Try to ensure that the JSR process examines practical issues and actions as well as policy development or institutional reforms. Do not let a JSR end up being a discussion of unfounded perceptions, concepts,

theory, and statements of "*if only*". Use real data and based on surveys, field experiences, projects, grounded studies.

If you have capacity constraints or particular weaknesses that make this difficult, ask for assistance from in-country partners. If in-country partners cannot or will not assist, make a request to global or regional partnerships or networks such as Sanitation and Water for All (SWA).[34] The 'Collaborative Behaviors' (SWA 2015) have been explicitly set to enable governments to receive appropriate support from their donors and other partners. However, invest some government human and financial resources into the process. Do not just depend on funding from others.

2.   **Donor engagement:** In countries where multiple donors are financing WASH and are not providing general budget support, JSRs are one of the few mechanisms for mutual accountability. Thus, although government needs to take the lead, donors have to take responsibility for JSRs to happen, and must play an active role. This includes making themselves accountable for their results.

3.   **JSRs can evolve and improve over time:** You can start small, depending on what you and your partners can afford. This may mean initially limiting the scope to a few topics. Originally the JSR may take information from a few distinct projects, perceptions of the challenges and opportunities, as well as data from existing surveys. Try to bring financial data, however limited, into the first cycle. Even limited financial data stimulates thinking, questions, and ideas for subsequent cycles. Simple maps showing who is working where can be very insightful. Over time, more data can be drawn in and the scope can be widened.

However limited, try to include some specific field visits to talk to local authorities, service providers, and water users in the process. This helps to ground everyone in realities, while providing a specific task as well as environment that brings different stakeholders closer together.

Note that stakeholders with experience from JSRs in other countries may try to shake up the process by bringing in their experiences and new ideas. These should at least be considered, noting that contexts are different and not every so-called "solution" can be transplanted from one place to another without the process of getting there.

4.   **Involve finance and planning ministries:** Whether you are planning to start your first JSR process, or whether they already take place, involve the finance and planning ministry/ministries. These ministries can inform you what the sector needs to demonstrate, what information it needs to provide and what is required to attract more government investment. By involving them in the JSR process, relationships can be built between technical agencies and these ministries. This can lead to a deeper understanding of WASH and its finance.

Recent innovations and reforms in public financial management provide citizens with access to financial information that can enable a better understand how WASH is being financed (or not).
Most finance ministries can provide information on WASH budgets and expenditures by different government agencies and departments. Depending on the way that donor funds are captured, this information might also be available and may even be in the public domain.

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[34] Sanitation and Water for All (SWA) is a global partnership of over 90 country governments, external support agencies, civil society organizations, and other development partners working together to catalyze political leadership and action, improve accountability, and use scarce resources more effectively. Partners work towards a common vision of universal access to safe water and adequate sanitation. Find out more on: http://sanitationandwaterforall.org

5. **Participation:** An effective JSR process brings diverse stakeholders together into networks to learn and foster change. Do everything you can to ensure that representatives from all government agencies that are involved in the scope of your JSR participate (for example, local government, education, health, environment, water resources, and infrastructure). Provide the opportunity for donor agencies, support agencies, international and local NGOs and CSOs, relevant private sector, academia, and the media to take part. Do not only include development agencies, but also those involved in humanitarian assistance. This is particularly important in fragile states or those suffering from protracted crisis. If humanitarian organizations or others are reluctant to take part, take this up with the WASH Cluster Lead, or take note and pull them into the next cycle. Developing a culture of participation may take time. Reach out to academic and research institutions and invite media representatives to participate. There will be differences of opinions, and at times this may not be comfortable. But over time these exchanges and discussions will unleash creativity and strengthen the sector. NGOs, NGO networks, and the WASH cluster have a key role to play in bringing unseen issues to the table at JSRs.

   Remember that a JSR is a social and political, as well as technical, process. This means that the political leadership, as well as civil society, also need to be informed and contribute to it. Ensuring water and sanitation services and trying to reach the SDGs can build citizen confidence and trust.

6. **Deciding priorities and actions:** Setting priority actions (or undertakings) is not just a case of listing everything that needs to be done in WASH. The mechanism of setting priorities needs to be well-facilitated, so that realism is balanced with ambition. Priorities should be SMART (that is, Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound), specifying which government agency, donor, NGO/NGO network or academic organization will take the lead. If this is not done, the priority actions are set up to fail from the outset. This undermines confidence and does not build interstakeholder trust. It may be wise for a smaller team to actually agree and finalize the priority actions rather than trying to do this under pressure at the JSR gathering itself.

   All priorities that require financial resources relating to WASH implementation or policy changes must be multiyear. The first year may thus focus on securing finance, preparing a work plan and other tasks that do not require specific financial resources. The second and third years (or even more) involve action. Ensure that the JSR documentation (including the priorities) in the public domain (point 7 below) supports accountability for the fulfilment (or nonfulfillment) of priority actions. This also may help to ensure that they are realistic, ambitious and SMART.

   Priorities set at the JSR should not become a replacement for agency work plans. Try to avoid accumulating more and more priority actions every year. Only so much can be done!

7. **JSR documentation and dissemination:** Consolidation of data and information from diverse sources is a critical and demanding aspect of the JSR process. The JSR provides a process for reflecting on data and its implications for the sector, state, and country. The documents and reports generated before and after the JSR gathering are very important. Proper referencing is essential. The actual JSR process followed should be properly documented, particularly given the high staff turnover among all state and nonstate actors in fragile states and countries suffering from protracted crisis. Sector performance reports that consolidate data are very important resources. If skills or human resources in government to prepare the documentation are lacking, second someone into government to help, particularly to train and mentor staff on the job.

   Preparing these reports is not enough. They also need to be widely disseminated, thus enabling stakeholders in-country and those elsewhere to see what has been reported, learn from each other,

copy things, and provide critique that can improve the JSR process and outputs. JSR reports must be placed online. The first priority is to make these available to the public on a government website. In addition, and as an interim solution, support agencies, international NGOs and donors should place JSR reports onto their country pages. Online access to national WASH JSR documents must become an integral part of national and global WASH culture.

It needs to be relatively easy to find out whether a JSR process took place, what was discussed as well as the priority actions set. Newspaper inserts, posters (for example, in government and NGO offices) and radio programs are ideal ways to inform the public about the JSR process and status of WASH in the country. Civic understanding of WASH funding, strategies, and programs is essential as countries strive to fulfil the human right to water and sanitation and reach the SDGs.

8. **The interface between the JSR and the wider sector, and context:** Everyone involved in the JSR needs to create the interface between the JSR process and service delivery, project implementation, reforms, and the wider context. In fact, this does not only apply to government but also to its partners.

    The JSR process can form part of the cycle of service delivery, project implementation, management, and reforms that take place in the country. The JSR can be used to review finance, progress, and status of WASH. However, you also need to embed the JSR process within existing reporting and planning. This may happen incrementally and requires the seizing of opportunities that can strengthen the JSR process. Examples are harnessing new local government reporting requirements that are part of decentralization reforms, reaching out to draw the national WASH cluster report into the JSR, working with the national statistics office to explore which survey data need to be collected or questions that need to be modified, and tapping into academic work on the sector.

    It may be very difficult to achieve priority actions set if government finance for WASH is low, or government is not investing in strengthening capacity. The importance of agreeing to realistic timeframes to secure funding for priority actions (where necessary) has already been stated. Donors with long-term commitment to the country and to WASH can also help to support the achievement of priority actions. If government needs such support but cannot attract donors that meet the needs, then this can be brought to the attention of the international community through global networks or partnerships such as SWA.[34] No credible WASH plan should go unfunded. To reach the SDG targets for WASH, the global sector needs to support governments to address finance and capacity gaps.

9. **Review the JSR process, relevance, effectiveness, and impact:** JSRs can become more and more effective from one cycle to the next. However, improvements are unlikely unless time is taken to reflect on JSR objectives, the process itself, priority actions, and achievements. The aforementioned JSR documentation is important to take stock. Consulting with WASH implementing agencies, donors, academia, and the media can help to identify potential improvements. Everyone should try to channel critique into constructive ideas for improvement. Always remember that a JSR is a process and not an event.

    Chapter 6 of this report provides visual checklists that can be used to analyze the JSR process and its linkage to the wider context. Note that you may have other elements to add. Table 5, and Appendixes 1 and 4, may be useful for benchmarking your country with respect to others. Consider how to link the JSR process with national planning and SDG targets. This may help to strategically target interventions. It may also help to get the attention of the finance ministry and external donors who want to see these targets achieved by 2030.

    It may be decided that the JSR scheduling or timeframe should be changed, or that a JSR is not relevant, or no longer necessary as its functions are fulfilled elsewhere.

The WASH sector

10.   **Sector Investment Plan:** Every country should develop a realistic sector investment plan for WASH or wider, depending on the scope of the sector in-country. It must be able to show different investment scenarios, and models such as reaching the national targets, the SDGs, and lower levels of service. A good sector investment plan is a tool that will enable you to show graphically what is to be expected for rural and urban water supply and sanitation coverage, service levels, and functionality for different levels of investment.

It will show what happens when financial resources are invested in different ways (for example, rural/urban, capital/maintenance/rehabilitation/institutional support). The finance ministry and global community require facts about what will happen with the lifespan of services if inadequate (or adequate) resources are allocated. A good sector investment plan is a very powerful tool.

11.   **National (or state) monitoring and evaluation framework, and reporting:** It is very common for countries to embark on a first few WASH JSR processes without a monitoring and evaluation framework. Given the important role that JSR processes play in bringing stakeholders together (sometimes for the first time), this should not stop you, but it is not ideal in the long run. Eventually, gaps become apparent and stakeholders will point out that roles and responsibilities need to be clarified, or that data cannot be compared due to different definitions. There is often discontent about what exactly to report at the JSR on and a call for performance indicators.

You can systematically address these problems by developing a good monitoring and evaluation framework. This sets out what will be measured, including indicators, and by whom. This usually takes over a year. Consult widely in the preparations, particularly in countries with many government WASH agencies or nonstate actors. However, don't become bogged down. After all, the framework can be revised later to reflect change in context. Government needs to invest financial and human resources in the process, and strong leadership is essential. Pull in support from outside as required, such as for peer review.

The scope of the framework may comprise WASH or it may be wider. This depends entirely on how the sector is structured within the particular country. The geographic scope may be nationwide or, in the case of federal systems, state or regionwide. One state or region may take the lead, with others, including the federal government, copying and adapting later on. The framework needs to capture humanitarian assistance as well as development intervention.

In some countries, such a framework is created very early on. However, if the government staff have very little experience of implementation or of how reporting actually works in practice, this can be quite a theoretical exercise. Additionally, if the national government is funding only a little implementation, it will be difficult for staff to set an example of reporting since there is very little to report! In this case, staff could be supported to get out into the field to report on activities of other organizations as a training exercise, or could take part in an exchange program with another country where reporting skills can be learned.

Monitoring and evaluation requires human and financial resources. It is not enough to simply set indicators, establish a database, or use smart phones to collect data. Human capacities are required to collect, store, analyze, and synthesize data, as well as to present and communicate it. Skills are needed, for example, in using spreadsheets, preparing graphs and tables, writing reports, and making oral presentations. Without these capacities, and their application, a monitoring and evaluation framework remains a document on a shelf. This is taken up by the next point.

12. **Capacity for JSR participation and monitoring and evaluation:** Leading and effectively participating in JSR processes can build skills, but also requires a certain level of skill in the first place. JSR processes provide in-country stakeholders with an opportunity to learn by doing (including making mistakes).

That means that even if participants have never taken part, or led a JSR process before, or taken up an important role, it is all right. The action of doing it will provide the chance to learn and improve for the future. And remember that nobody is alone but part of a network with others who have different experience and abilities. Their encouragement as well as critique should improve the process, and everyone's performance over time. This study report and the associated learning note provide a basic understanding of the JSR process and how it relates to the wider context. This is can be used as a starting point.

Drawing together diverse sets of data and information, writing and reviewing reports, making the most out of field visits, moderating the JSR gathering, and facilitating priority setting are all highly skilled activities. Government in the lead may consider contracting or requesting others with know-how and experience to train and support you, preferably 'on the job'. With many more countries starting the WASH JSR journey, the pool of expertise is growing. Note that the arduous task of pulling together and quality assuring an accurate and well-written sector performance report or status report may require technical support and mentoring spanning a number of years.

The need for ad-hoc, as well as more systematic, professional development in relation to JSRs and wider monitoring and evaluation is taken up below.

13. **Long-term partner commitment**: Donors, please improve your adherence to the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, and consider the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals[35] that were endorsed in 2011 by conflict affected and fragile countries, development partners, and civil society. The set of 'Collaborative Behaviors', endorsed by SWA partners, contextualizes some of the above WASH (SWA 2015) and covers:
    - Enhancing government leadership of the sector planning process.
    - Strengthening and using country systems.
    - Using one information and mutual accountability platform.
    - Building sustainable water and sanitation financing strategies.

Long-term donor commitment to the sector and the country is absolutely essential. Notably, undertaking analysis of the sector or providing technical advisory services are not enough; funding of WASH implementation (through government systems) is a crucial element. This also provides incentive for governments to improve reporting, monitoring, and planning processes.

Government staff need to have the opportunity to 'learn by doing' and themselves make the crucial links between the JSR process and what is happening on the ground, as reflected in the statement from Honorable Shukri Haji Ismail, Minister of Environment and Rural Development, Somaliland: "*How can we learn how public financial management processes work if we do not have our own project funds to manage*?" (Richey 2015).

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[35] **Goals: Legitimate Politics:** Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution; **Security:** Establish and strengthen people's security; **Justice:** Address injustices and increase people's access to justice; **Economic Foundations:** Generate employment and improve livelihoods; and **Revenues and Services:** Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2011).

Also, be reminded *that "states and government are not monoliths. Even in contexts where the state is predatory, there will usually be parts of the system, or particular institutions, bureaucrats or ministries with which aid actors can work"* (Mosel and Levine 2014).

Furthermore, note that programming in fragile states must be flexible enough to adapt to major changes in local circumstances, with reporting and review processes that are able to incorporate such changes. In the case of JSR processes, this could mean adapting to a constitutional amendment, revising analysis to deal with changes in the number, or boundaries of states or local governments, and retraining new government staff (repeatedly), or increasing coordination and incorporating reports of WASH emergency supplies and rehabilitation during and after an emergency.

14. **Reporting by NGOs, CSOs, donor agencies, and other development partners:** An antagonistic relationship between NGOs/CSOs and governments is common in many countries, and may be even stronger in fragile states or those suffering from protracted crisis. NGOs and CSOs also compete for scarce resources and experienced staff. NGOs often play a double role of service provider and holding government to account. Arguably, NGOs and CSOs are often much more accountable to their donors (who are often based outside the country) than to governments or citizens within the country. If the SDG target of universal access to water, sanitation and hygiene is to be met, NGO and CSO reporting in-country needs to feed into the bigger picture and enable the identification of who is being excluded from service improvements.

    NGO networks, umbrella organizations, and NGO consortia all have a very important role to play in bringing these organizations together and facilitating as well as consolidating NGO and CSO reporting. If there is no such entity in place, this should be established. Arguably, national (or state) networks that bring WASH (or a wider scope of) NGOs and CSOs together should become part of national and international WASH culture.

    Once such networks are in place, the government, international NGOs or donor agencies can provide financial incentives for reporting on investment, activities and outputs, as well as outcomes and learning. In the case of humanitarian agencies, there is also need for reporting on what is being done and there must be extremely good reasons for not doing so. The WASH cluster may provide an umbrella for humanitarian organizations but should be linked to a broader NGO network or association. There should also be a plan for transitioning from a cluster system to a government-led coordination committee.

    Furthermore, it is also essential to report the financial as well as in-kind support by donor agencies and other partners in-country in a transparent manner. With this information available, and consolidated, it is possible to analyze financing gaps which can be discussed at the JSR gathering. If formal donor reporting mechanisms exist (such as, to an aid management unit within the finance ministry), these should be adhered to. By drawing on this information and presenting it within the JSR process, sector ministries are able to hold donor agencies to account, thus contributing to mutual accountability. Donor coordination bodies are also very important in bringing donors together and moving towards a harmonized engagement with government.

15. **Capacity strengthening through technical assistance and mentoring:** International technical assistance as well as mentoring can be instrumental in providing support to the JSR processes. However, to be effective, it should be in the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and aligned with country systems and needs.

Governments and their development partners must have a common understanding of the actual work modalities of technical assistance or mentoring personnel. It needs to be demand driven with full accountability and value for money. It is essential that support is given to others in their work rather than doing it for them. However, there are examples where technical assistance may take the lead in, say, the first year, show (and learn) by example and subsequently hand over activities to others. Consolidating and presenting data and quality assuring a county's first sector performance report is one such example. In addition, governments must be able to warn and ultimately dismiss support personnel that are not adequate.

16. **Global Actions:** There are a number of actions that multilateral and bilateral agencies, as well as international organizations and global networks and partnerships, could take to strengthen in-country JSR process for WASH and their linkages to the WASH sector:

- Create incentives for, and encourage, country level staff working in development assistance and humanitarian work to effectively engage in and strengthen JSR processes and linkages, including reporting in accordance with local, national, and WASH cluster reporting systems.
- Use the JSR process to inform and guide agencies in-country activities, funding, and programs.
- Strengthen the role of GLAAS in monitoring WASH laws, policies and processes, including JSRs. Improve the evidence on WASH JSRs in the GLAAS report by providing the evidence that they took place, including links to the most recent relevant documents, also noting where these are not available.
- Support countries to start or review their own WASH JSR processes and links. Enable countries to learn from each other by facilitating learning visits, multicountry seminars or remote exchanges (for example, discussion groups, webinars).
- Clarify linkages between WASH "sustainability checks" and other audits, evaluations or analytical tools such as the UNICEF Bottleneck Analysis and JSRs.
- Set an example of transparency in WASH by publishing country reports, evaluation reports, and physical audits online and placing WASH JSR documentation on country pages.
- Undertake another multicounty review of WASH JSRs as a follow-on to this study in the next three to five years. Improve the methodology. Address certain aspects in greater depth, such as the relationship between JSR effectiveness and how well they are embedded in sector reforms, finance agreements, program implementation or long-term donor support.
- Undertake further work to deepen the understanding of how to provide flexible but effective support, including capacity development in fragile states and countries in protracted crisis.
- Support the development of training materials, online courses and on-job training for leading and participating in JSR process (including data compilation and analysis, writing and reviewing reports, proper referencing, field validation, moderation, conflict resolution, and setting priorities) as well as the linkages between JSRs and national planning and reporting.

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Appendix 1: Joint Sector Review Reporting

Country	Year	Documentation			Available Online		
		Input Papers	Sector Performance or Status Report	Gathering Report[36]	Input Papers	Sector Performance or Status Report	Gathering Report
Burkina Faso	2013	✔	✘	✔ [37]	Some	-	✔
Burundi	2013	✘[38]	✘	✔[39]	✘	✘	✘
Ethiopia	2014		✘	✔		-	✘
Ghana	2013	✘	✘ [40]	✔	-	-	✘
Kenya	2015	✘	✔ [41]	✔	✘	✔ / ✘[42]	✘
Liberia	2015	✘	✔	✔	-	✔	✔
Malawi	2014	✘	✔	✔	✘	✘	✘
Nepal	2014	✔ [43]	✘	✔	✔ [43]	✔	✔
Niger	2014						✘
Rwanda	2015		✘	✔	✘	✘	✘
Senegal	2014		✔[44]			✔	✘
South Sudan	2012	✘	✘	✔	-	-	✘
Sierra Leone	2014	✘	✔ [45]	✔	-	✘	✘
Tanzania	2014	✘	✔	✔	✘	✘	✘
Uganda	2015	✘	✔	✔	-	✔	✔
Yemen	2006	✔[46]	✘	✔	✔	-	✔
Zambia	2014	✔[47]	✘	✔	✘	-	✘
Zimbabwe	2011	✘	✘	✔	-	-	✘

[36] The meeting reports are also in the form of Proceedings, Outcome Statement (Sierra Leone) or Aid Mémoire (Yemen).

[37] Documents from 2008 to 2010 are available on the Eau Burkina portal (www.eauburkina.org), with documents for 2012 and 2013 filed under "Accueil" rather than with the other JSR documents.

[38] Copies of JSR gathering presentations which provide an overview over sector performance are handed out to participants. These are the basis for elaboration of recommendations.

[39] Meeting report includes information on sector strategies implementation and reporting on performance indicators.

[40] Sector Performance Reports only prepared for the Ghana Water Forums in 2009 and 2010, but not for the 2011 or 2013 events.

[41] In 2015, the 2013/14 Annual Water Sector Review and the CSO Sector Performance Report were analyzed. WASREB also publishes a Water Services Sub-Sector Impact report but this is not referenced in the JSR gathering report. However, WASREB did make a presentation at the gathering.

[42] The 2013/14 Annual Water Sector Review Report (MEWMR 2014) was found online by December 2015.

[43] Inputs from various working groups prior to the JSR event are incorporated in the JSR technical report.

[44] Although the report title refers to the Joint Sector Review, the content is actually a sector status report—MHA (2014).

[45] The 2014 report does not seem to have been finalized.

[46] Seven input papers were prepared (Anon-Yemen, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, 2005f, No date)

[47] Draft Joint Water Sector Review Report.

Appendix 2: Joint Sector Review Documentation Sources

Country	Data Sources (Report, Years)
Afghanistan	n/a
Burkina Faso	Documents from 2008 to 2010 are available on the Eau Burkina portal (www.eauburkina.org), with documents for 2012 and 2013 filed under "Accueil" rather than with the other review documents.
Burundi	GIZ staff member (JSR reports for all years).
East Timor	n/a
Ethiopia	Multi-Stakeholder Review and Joint Technical Review reports obtained from technical advisor to government.
Ghana	Study team member who had worked in Ghana.
Indonesia	n/a
Jordan	Donor technical support staff provided information which showed that no JSR took place.
Kenya	Annual Water Sector Report (13/14) provided by KEWASANET. Report online: http://www.kewasnet.co.ke/; WASREB Water Services Sub-Sector Impact report (7 editions since 2008), online: www.wasreb.go.ke/impact-reports
Liberia	http://wash-liberia.org (SPR 2013; responses to JSR 2014). http://www.rural-water-supply.net/en/ (JSR 2014).
Malawi	http://www.rural-water-supply.net/en/ (SPR 2011). Draft reports obtained from development partner in Malawi (SPR 2014 and JSR 2014).
Mozambique	Government staff member (*Ministério das Obras Públicas, Habitação e Recursos Hidricos*).
Nepal	Sector Efficiency Unit, Ministry of Urban Development: http://seiu.gov.np/.
Niger	Development partner staff member.
Rwanda	Reports obtained from consultant working in Rwanda (Forward-Looking JSR Report, 2013/14).
Senegal	Reports for two years, that is, RAC 2010 and RAC 2014 available on: http://www.pepam.gouv.sn.
Somalia	n/a
South Sudan	Reports provided by central government staff member.
Sierra Leone	Reports obtained from technical advisor to government (SPR 2012; Draft SPR 2013 and Statement of outcomes 2014).
Tanzania	JSR reports obtained from development partner staff member. TAWASANET reports available from their website.
Uganda	SPR Reports (from 2006 [third report] to 2014) and JSR Agreed Minutes 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014 available on government website: http://www.mwe.go.ug. UWASNET reports listed on: http://www.uwasnet.org but could be downloaded in Dec 2015. 2015 report obtained from staff member of NGO.
West Bank and Gaza	Reports which initially appeared to be for a JSR could be accessed via government website http://www.lacs.ps once authorization had been provided. These reports enabled it to be clarified that no JSRs for WASH or Water have been undertaken in the West Bank and Gaza.
Yemen	Reports downloaded from www.yemenwater.org/?s=Joint+Annual+Review&lang=en [accessed 26.06.15] (Joint Annual Review Reports 2006); Republic of Yemen (2006), Joint Annual Review Reports for 2007 are referred to in Heun and Vulto (2008), but they have not been obtained or verified.
Zambia	Website of Danida http://openaid.um.dk/. Reports obtained from development partner staff member.
Zimbabwe	Government staff member (Joint Sector Review Report, 2011).

Appendix 3: Joint Sector Review Leadership

Country	Ministry/Ministries that Led the WASH/Water JSR Process
Burkina Faso	*Ministère de l'Eau, des Aménagements Hydrauliques et de l'Assainissement* (established in 2013)
Burundi	*Ministère de l'Eau, de l'Environnement, de l'Aménagement du Territoire et de l'Urbanisme* (MEEATU) and *Ministère de l'Energie et des Mines* (MEM)
Ethiopia	Ministry of Water and Energy and National WaSH Steering Committee (implementation by the National WaSH Technical Team)
Ghana	Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing
Kenya	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (up to 2014) Ministry of Water and Irrigation Services (from 2015)
Lao	Department of Health and Hygiene Promotion (DHHP) and Ministry of Health and Department of Housing and Urban Planning (DHUP), Ministry of Public Works and Transport
Liberia	Ministry of Public Works
Malawi	Ministry of Irrigation, Agriculture and Water Development
Nepal	Ministry of Urban Development (Sector Efficiency Improvement Unit)
Niger	*Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de l'Assainissement*
Rwanda	Ministry of Infrastructure
Senegal	*Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de l'Assainissement*
South Sudan	Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
Sierra Leone	Ministry of Water Resources and Ministry of Health and Sanitation
Tanzania	Ministry of Water
Uganda	Ministry of Water and Environment
Yemen	Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) and Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI)
Zambia	Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Development (MMEWD)
Zimbabwe	Ministry of Water Resource Development and Management

Appendix 4: Overview of Aspects of Country JSR Process Experience

Aspect	Country	Mature		Intermediate						
		Uganda	Rwanda	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Ethiopia	Kenya	Malawi	Tanzania	Zambia
Leadership and Participation	**Led** by sector ministry	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Participation of broad range of state and nonstate actors	✓	✓[48]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
	Cooperation by lead donor (if there is one)	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Review Procedures	**Frequency and Regularity,** for example, every one or two years	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗
	Preparation activities take weeks to months	✓		✓		✓	✗	✓		✓
	Reviews the **priorities** of the previous JSR	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
	Review against a **strategy** or **work plan**	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
	Review against **indicators** and targets	✓	✓	✓	✓		✗			✗
Scope, Reports and Information Used	Draws on primary and secondary **data,** studies, and topical inputs	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓
	Data and information **consolidated** into one report before the gathering	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗/✓[49]
	Includes field **visits**	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓[50]
	JSR gathering **report**			✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
Gathering	Includes a **gathering** (forum, conference or meeting)	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Includes field **visits**	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Priorities	Sets out recommendations or priorities for action	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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[48] Although the main JSR gatherings are only attended by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Ministry of Finance, the consultative process beforehand is reported to involve all sector stakeholders.
[49] Draft Joint Water Sector Review Report.
[50] The review processes included visits to five provinces to assess and debate relevant issues (Anon-Zambia 2014).

Aspect		Country	With Commitment			Discontinued			
			Liberia	Nepal	Sierra Leone	Ghana	South Sudan	Yemen	Zimbabwe
Leadership and Participation	**Led** by sector ministry		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
	Participation of broad range of state and nonstate actors		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
	Cooperation by lead donor (if there is one)		✘	✔	-	✘	-	✔	-
Review Procedures	**Regular cycle**, for example, 6 months, 1 year or 2 years		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✘	✘
	Pre-event **preparation** activities take a few weeks to several months		✔/✘	✔	?	✔	✘	✔[52]	?
	Reviews last JSR **priorities**		✘[51]	✘	✘[52]	✘	✘		-
	Review against **a strategy or work plan**		✔[51]	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘
	Review against **indicators** and targets		✘	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘
Scope, Reports and Information Used	Draws on primary and secondary **data** sources, studies, and topical inputs		✔	✔	✘	✔	✘	✔[53]	✘
	Data and information **consolidated** into one report before gathering		✘/✔[54]	✘	✘/✔[52]	✘	✘	✘	✘
	Includes field **visits**		✔	✔	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘
	JSR gathering **report**		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	
Gathering	Includes a **gathering** (forum, conference or meeting)		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
	Include field/monitoring **visits**		✘	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘
Priorities	Sets out recommendations or priorities for action		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✘	✔

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[51] JSR 2015 reported against strategic objectives in the Sector Strategic Plan and the Capacity Development Plan (CDP).

[52] Sierra Leone Sector Performance Report for 2013 does not seem to have been finalized. However, it does include a review of commitments from previous JSR. Outcome statement from 2014 does not mention progress against the previous commitments.

[53] 6 working group reports (Anon-Yemen 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, and 2005f).

[54] A Sector Performance Report was prepared as part of the 2015 review but had not been finalized prior to the review meeting.

Appendix 5: WASH (and Water) Sector Legal and Institutional Context for Select Countries

Element of Context \ Country	Afghanistan	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Kenya	Liberia	Nepal	Rwanda	South Sudan	Sierra Leone	Tanzania	Uganda	Yemen
Reference Year		2013										2006
Water Act or Law				✔	✔	✔		I[55]				✔
Water Policy	✔		✔			✔	✔		✔[56]	✔	✔	✔
Strategy or planning framework		✔[57]	✔[58]				✔			✔[59]	✔	✔[60]
Compact or MoU					✔	✘	✘		✘			✘
Joint Assistance Strategy					✘	✘			✘	✔	✔	✘
Sector Investment Plan	✘		✘		✔	✘	✔	✔[61]			✔	✔[60]
Medium Term Expenditure Framework			✔			✘		✘	✔	✔	✔	I[62]
General budget support					✔	✘		✘	✘		✔	✘
Sector budget support						✘		✘			✔	✔
National program		✔[63]	✔		✘	✘			✘	✔[64]	✔[65]	✔[60]
Sector-Wide Approach			✘	✔	✘	✘	✘	✘	✘	✔	✔	✘
Implementation manual	✔[66]				✘				✘		✔	✘

[55] In progress—Water Bill at Cabinet for ratification (MWRI 2012).
[56] Water and Sanitation Policy (2010).
[57] Action Plan for Integrated Water Resources Management (PAGIRE) from 2003.
[58] SNEau—*Stratégie Nationale de l'Eau* and *Plan d'action de la mise en oeuvre de la Politique Nationale d'Assainissement*.
[59] National Water Sector Development Strategy.
[60] National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (Ward et al. 2007).
[61] Rural WASH.
[62] Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) base and information for a sector MTEF are referred to (Anon-Yemen No date).
[63] Program National Drinking Water and Sanitation (PN-AEPA) adopted in 2006.
[64] Water Sector Development Program.
[65] National Program for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation.
[66] Rural WASH.

Country / Element of Context	Afghanistan	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Kenya	Liberia	Nepal	Rwanda	South Sudan	Sierra Leone	Tanzania	Uganda	Yemen
Reference Year		2013										2006
Water supply inventory					✗[67]	✓		?		✓[68]	✓	✗
Monitoring framework			✗[69]		✓[70]	✗			✗[71]		✓	✗
Coordination mechanisms			✓[72]		✓	✓	✓[73]		✓		✓	✓
Donor or development partner working group					✗	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
NGO coordination or network					✗[74]	✓			✓	✓	✓	✗
WASH Cluster						✓		✓				?

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[67] Water Point Mapping data collected in 2011, but have not been kept up to date.

[68] Water Point Mapping.

[69] Indicator Guide for WASH was published in 2014.

[70] The 2014 Sector Performance Report states that the National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework is set up but that it was not used for the 2014 report.

[71] There is no published Monitoring Framework, but the 2012 Sector Performance Report lists 17 indicators.

[72] Monthly sector group meetings (*Groupe Sectoriel Eau et Assainissement*).

[73] WATSAN Sector Working Group Secretariat.

[74] Note that some NGOs are members of the WASH NGO Consortium.

Appendix 6: Scope of Sector Performance Reports or JSR Event Reports

Data for select countries (for most recent JSR)

Country	Household WASH (No. of People with Access)				Household Water Services	Sewerage	Status of Institutional WASH		Water Resources			Agriculture/ Irrigation/ Water for Production	Solid Waste	Finance	Project/ Program Achievements	Partners	Legal and Institutional		
	Water		Sanitation		Functionality / Reliability		Primary Schools	Health Centers	Regulation	Monitoring	Pollution/ degradation						Coordination/ Harmonization	Legal Framework	Staffing
	R[75]	U	R	U															
Burkina Faso	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗[76]	✗[76]	✗[76]	✗	✗	✗	✓[77]	✗	✗	✗	✗
Burundi	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗[78]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓[79]	✓[80]	✓	✓	✗
Kenya	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗		✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗
Liberia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓[81]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓[82]	✓	✓	✗
Malawi	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
Niger	✓		✓		✓		✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗
Rwanda	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗		✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	
Senegal	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Sierra Leone	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓[83]	✗	✓	✓	✗
Uganda	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗

[75] R = Rural; U = Urban.

[76] Integrated Water Resources Management is included in the aide-mémoire but no data on regulation, monitoring or pollution/degradation are presented.

[77] Achievements of National Program.

[78] Indicator has been agreed, but data not yet available.

[79] Achievements of National Program.

[80] Includes maps of provinces showing which organization is undertaking construction and rehabilitation for water and sanitation for each province (includes over 16 local and international organizations).

[81] Hydrometry data are reported.

[82] Not all in-country WASH partners are reporting their activities and funding to governments.

[83] List of projects, budgets, and funding sources given for SALWACO water supply projects; number of beneficiaries claimed by the WASH Consortium Projects are given, but without details of the organizations, or locations undertaking the work.

Appendix 7: Examples of Scope and Information Used in JSRs

Data in the 2014 Multi-Stakeholder Forum in **Ethiopia** is limited. There is no consolidated premeeting report, and the full proceedings do not include any government data on finance, outputs or outcomes. From the meeting reports, it is not possible to form a clear picture of government and development partners in WASH implementation in the country. There is considerable mention of ongoing government and development partner activities to finalize plans and guidance documents.

The 2012 Sector Performance Report for **Sierra Leone** (MWR and MHS 2013) provides a succinct overview of the national policies as well as the legislative and institutional framework. This is particularly appropriate given that major aspects of the legal and institutional framework were (and still are) being established after the civil war.

The 2015 JSR in **Liberia** reviewed progress of 144 objectives in the Sector Strategic Plan, plus 93 objectives in the Capacity Development Plan and the information presented in the Sector Performance Report (for instance, Finance, Ebola Response Finance, WASH Sector Ebola Response, Urban Water and Sanitation, Ebola Waste Management, Rural Water Access, Water Resources, Solid Waste Management, Community-Led Total Sanitation, Hygiene, WASH in Health Facilities, Water Quality, WASH in Schools, Gender, Coordination and Monitoring, and Advocacy and Awareness).

In **Malawi**, the 2014 Sector Performance Report (MoAI and WD 2014) includes headline indicators for the % national budget allocated to the sector, % of finds allocated to the districts and % vacancy rates. Data are presented for 2012/13 and 2013/14, as are subsector breakdowns and a discussion of the changes to expenditure and reasons for inadequate recruitment. Sector Performance Reports were prepared in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, and include national surveys and government data. The JSR workshop report reflects on presentations by the Water and Environmental Sanitation Network (WESNET) and untapped opportunities from the Local Development Fund.

The data, referencing, and presentation for the **Nepal** review could be strengthened. The 2014 JSR Technical Report (MoUD 2014b) draws on national coverage figures from the Census (CBS 2012) and surveys of functionality from the National Management Information Project (no references). Total WASH sector expenditure by three ministries (2011-14) is set out, but not referenced. MoUD (2014b) states that *"data analysis for sector financing was difficult without having updated or latest information"*, but the Ministry of Finance publishes an annual budget, including releases and expenditure for the previous year for all departments. Nepal also has an Aid Management Platform (AMP), including an online portal (http://amis.mof.gov.np/portal/). Data from both of these sources could be pulled into the JSR process.

The proceedings for **South Sudan** cover issues in relation to rural and urban water supply, community-led total sanitation, Guinea Worm Eradication, borehole construction and maintenance, data management, the NGO cluster mechanism, and concerns about inadequate finance and lack of human resources. There is no comprehensive overview of WASH implementation in the country as a whole. The need to widen the discussions in future meetings to include water facilities for animals is noted (Anon 2012a). Data on the issues covered and financial investments are lacking but concerns, perspectives, and key issues from three states are clearly presented.

The **Tanzanian** Review covers the Water and Sanitation Development Programme for WASH and water resources (MoW 2014a)*.* In 2014, the scope was limited to the implementation of this program, leaving out efforts by others. The review drew heavily on the Water Sector Status Report of the National Programme (MoW 2014b). Despite 15 national surveys for Water and Sanitation published up to 2013 (JMP 2015b), coverage figures or trends are not included. Select data from two surveys (from 2011 and 2010) are referred to (MoW 2014b, p. 33). The water utilities regulator has used an online performance monitoring system to collect monthly data since 2012, but data were not used in review reports. Aspects of Water and Sanitation status and differences between districts and towns were covered by the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network equity report (TAWASANET 2013), but this was not reflected, or referenced in the JSR proceedings (MoW 2014a). Some indicators are presented in the proceedings (MoW 2014, p. 20-21), but the sources of the data are not clear.

The established review process in **Uganda** is very wide in scope (including water resource, the environment, and WASH). The review draws on primary and secondary data as well as studies and reports and pulls them into an annual sector performance report, which is prepared and disseminated (in soft copy) ahead of the event. Progress is reported against the targets set in the performance measurement framework. However, in the early years, the JSR meetings drew on less data and did not report against indicators and targets, and there was no sector performance report.